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TRIPS' Rebound: An Historical
Analysis of How the TRIPS Agreement
Can Ricochet Back Against the United
States
Donald P. Harris*
"That grounded maxim
So rife and celebrated in the mouths
Of wisest men; that to the public good
Private respects must yield."
-Milton 1
I. INTRODUCTION
United States intellectual property law is often regarded as the result of
careful balancing between private and public interests. More specifically, it
is regarded as balancing the public interest in gaining access to new
products and knowledge against the private interest in recouping research
and development costs and earning profits for inventions and creative
works. This view of promoting both private and public interests is puzzling
in light of Congress' and the Supreme Court's repeated avowals that
intellectual property laws are designed to promote public interests. 2 Indeed,
* Assistant Professor, James E. Beasley School of Law, Temple University; William H.
Hastie Fellow, LL.M. 2003, University of Wisconsin Law School; J.D. 1994, Loyola Law
School (Los Angeles). This Article was supported by a research grant from the University of
Wisconsin Law School. Thanks go to Jane Baron, Anthony Bocchino, John Kidwell, Heinz
Klug, David Post, Gregory Shaffer, and Amy Sinden for their insightful and invaluable
comments on earlier deafts. Thanks also go to Jason Marks for his capable search assistance.
1 JOHN MILTON, SAMSON AGONISTES, line 865.
2 Consumer politics theory states that consumers should have the widest possible access
to products and goods at the lowest possible cost; the theory is grounded in the principle that
"the good of the people is the chief law." See GILLIAN DAVIES, COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 1 (1994) (citing Cicero, De Legibus III, iii 8). See also BANKOLE SODIPO, PIRACY
AND COUNTERFEITING: GATT, TRIPS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1-2 (1997) [hereinafter
SODIPO, PIRACY]. Stated slightly differently, all laws should be enacted not only with the

public interest in mind, but with the public interest being the paramount, if not the exclusive,
consideration. "National laws are only enacted if they are in the public interest, or at least it
must be assumed that the enacting body so regards them." DAVIES, supra note 2. With
respect to patents, Professor Lessig similarly states that patents are not evil per se, but are so
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enshrined in the U.S. Constitution over two centuries ago was the primacy
of the public interest. 3 The Constitution grants Congress the power to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," which has been
interpreted as promoting progress with the sole aim of benefiting the
public. 4

This is not to suggest private interests play no part. Clearly, the public
benefits through the system of private rewards. Intellectual property laws
provide incentives to spur new and useful discoveries, which ultimately
benefit society. The intellectual property laws encourage invention and
investment by, on the one hand, providing inventors with a limited
monopoly to commercially exploit their inventions and, on the other hand,
by protecting intellectual property from piracy and misappropriation.5
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has held that because the public interest is
the "chief law,, 6 any true conflict between the public and private interests
must be resolved in favor of the public interest. 7 Despite this, there remains
considerable confusion regarding the purpose of the intellectual property
laws in the United States, as many argue for intellectual property laws
aimed primarily at benefiting private interests. Indeed, there appears to be
a gradual, but perceptible, shift in the focus, evidenced by the United
States' approach towards international intellectual property, which can be
seen through the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual

"if they do no social good." He explains that patents do no social good "if they benefit
certain companies at the expense of innovation generally." LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE
OF IDEAS 259 (2001). This is the fear of this article, namely that patents and the U.S. patent
policy are increasingly effecting no social good because they benefit certain companies at
the expense of innovation and the public interest.
3 Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 of the Constitution is referred to as the Intellectual Property Clause. It
states: "The Congress shall have the power ...[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." The clause is generally interpreted as two
proposals that "got packaged together." Giles S. Rich, The Principlesof Patentability,42 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 75, 77-78 (1960). Under this interpretation, Congress is given the power:
(1) to promote the progress of science by securing for limited times to authors the exclusive
right to their writings; and (2) to promote the progress of useful arts by securing for limited
times to inventors the exclusive right to their discoveries.
4 See infra Part III.B. 1.
5 Piracy and misappropriation reduce the profit the private patent owners receive for their
technology and discourage innovation and invention; they also weaken the owners' ability to
conduct future research and development.
6 See DAVIES, supra note 2.
7 "[C]opyright statutes must serve public, not private, ends." Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S.
Ct. 769, 803 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Also emblematic of the importance placed on
the public interest were: (1) Congress' limit on the period an inventor enjoyed exclusive
rights (the patent term); (2) the law's limitation on what can be patented (patentable subject
matter); and (3) the remedies available when a patentee abuses a patent (e.g., compulsory
licensing). See detailed discussion infra Part IV-V.
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Property Rights ("TRIPS").
Through TRIPS, the United States has sought an international
intellectual property regime that advances private interests, most notably
those of pharmaceutical companies. 9 TRIPS was designed to strengthen
and harmonize worldwide intellectual property rights protection. It requires
member countries to implement and enforce minimum standards for
protecting those rights. 10
TRIPS was successful in providing such
standards, with the result that increased revenue flowed back to countries
exporting intellectual property, particularly the United States."
As much of the current literature has detailed, TRIPS causes
devastating harm to developing countries.' 2 These harms include retarding
technological development, mass transfers of wealth out of these countries,
and other social costs such as the lack of access to medicines. Because of
the increased revenue flowing into the United States, there is less attention
to corresponding deleterious effects experienced by the United States.
This Article argues that TRIPS' focus on private interests will not only
harm developing countries, but also will rebound back against the United
States, thereby inflicting significant harm. Two related factors contribute to
this state of affairs. The first is that, traditional arguments notwithstanding,
intellectual property is no longer a matter solely within the sovereign power
of individual nations. Rather, intellectual property is in substance governed
by international law. As such, the United States loses sovereign power over
8

While technically speaking all such laws are national, as international laws are

implemented through domestic legislation, as will be discussed later, see infra Part III.A.), in
effect, the international laws are being implemented without regard to traditional domestic
interests. Accordingly, throughout this article, the two are distinguished. Certainly, there are
different considerations with international and national intellectual property regimes. Most
importantly, social costs (e.g., higher prices) imposed through national laws are generally
offset by the domestic benefits obtained through patents. International patenting imposes the
same social costs but does not provide the same benefits, as revenue generally flows out of
the country to the patent owner's country. See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW 248-249 (Anthony D'Amato and Doris Estelle Long, eds. 1998) [hereinafter D'Amato
& Long, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY]. Also, granting foreign patents can
retard further research in the patented technology by reducing competition, and can affect
countries disproportionately, depending on the level of protection in each country. Id. Thus,
there are reasons to treat national regimes differently in response to international concerns.
However, when doing so frustrates the very purpose of national laws, such different
treatment should not be countenanced.
9 See infra Part III.B.
10Id.
" See infra Part III.C.
12 See, e.g., Marci Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and
Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613 (1996); A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS - Natural
Rights and a "Polite Form of Economic Imperialism," 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415
(1996); Martin Kohr, How the South is Getting a Raw Deal, VIEWS FROM THE SOUTH, THE
EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION AND THE WTO ON THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES 22 (2000).
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intellectual property policy.
The United States' loss of sovereignty is exacerbated by the second
factor: TRIPS' inconsistent focus with traditional U.S. intellectual property
law and the Constitution's mandate that intellectual property law promote
progress to benefit the public. TRIPS is inconsistent with this mandate
because it places remuneration to owners of intellectual property above the
benefit to the public.' 3 Taken together, these factors suggest that in
implementing or enacting TRIPS compliant legislation, the United States is
failing in its duty to inquire whether, and ensure that, such legislation
promotes progress and is in the public interest.
13It is important to make here a distinction about the "public" interest. Throughout the
article two different public interests are revealed. The first public interest is the U.S.
domestic public interest. It is this interest that Congress must consider in passing intellectual
property laws. The second public interest is the global public interest. We can roughly
approximate this interest with developing countries and with benefiting the world society as
a whole. The developed countries can be equated with private interests and the developing
countries with public interests. Of course, this is a broad generalization. But, without
question, the developed countries are the major intellectual property exporting countries,
and, in this sense, can be seen as private patent owners. The developing countries, lacking
meaningful exportable intellectual property products, can be seen as public consumers.
Many commentators have recognized the need for an international scheme to take into
account countries' different levels of economic development. Reichman, for example, states
that:
the norms of intemational economic law represent a delicate balance between the interests of
states at different stages of development, and the absorption of intellectual property will have
to accommodate these norms and that balance ....

Premature efforts to accelerate the

process of harmonization without due regard to these differences and to the social costs of
overcoming them could boomerang against those countries pressing for rapid change and
could even widen the initial differences in the end.
Jerome H. Reichman, The TRIPs Component of the GA7T's Uruguay Round: Competitive
Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 171, 255 (1993). In any event, these two interests may not
always coincide. It is possible that the United States can pursue goals that at once fail to
promote the global public interest while promoting the U.S. public interest. For example,
arguments can be made that even though protection of private rights for pharmaceutical
products may harm impoverished developing countries, the revenue received from this
protection flows back to benefit the U.S. domestic public. In some sense this may be true;
however, the two interests are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, a benefit to the public interest
such as providing for access to low costs medicines also benefits the global interest.
Conversely, the United State's shift in focus to protect private rights harms both the global
public and the U.S. public. The wealth transfer from international revenue is more than
offset by the harm to the domestic public. Where only a relative few benefit from the wealth
transfer, a large segment is disadvantaged. Moreover, progress (as a synonym for public
interest) means more than a transfer of wealth to a privileged few. It means economic and
technological progress through the dissemination of knowledge and access to a wide variety
of goods at the lowest possible price. The focus on private rights through TRIPS falls short
of achieving this, both as to the domestic and the global public interest.
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This Article looks at the United States' efforts and underlying
philosophy in promoting TRIPS and the United States' contrasting domestic
intellectual property policy, as viewed from the perspective of the history
and development of United States' patent law.
Part II introduces
intellectual property harmonization and TRIPS. This part provides a brief
background to TRIPS, examining specific TRIPS provisions, including the
compulsory licensing, patent term, patentable subject matter, and parallel
import provisions.
Part III introduces the rebound effect. This part argues that TRIPS
results in a loss of sovereignty over intellectual property matters for all
countries, but notes the increased significance for the United States. Here,
the focus is on the inconsistency between TRIPS and traditional U.S.
intellectual property policy; inconsistency is demonstrated by examining
the history of U.S. patent law and focusing on the factors that influenced
that law including the need to promote the public interest. This part also
examines the reasons underlying TRIPS and the specific interests TRIPS
furthers. It argues that, unlike United States' patent law, private interests those of the pharmaceutical industry - largely motivated TRIpS. 14 This part
details the United States' strategy to promote stronger international
intellectual property protection through TRIPS .15 In sum, this part argues
that TRIPS, although promoted as a balanced private and public scheme, is
in reality a private rights regime. Parts IV and V attempt to ground the
above analysis by examining the history of and TRIPS' current effect on
two specific areas: compulsory licensing and the patent term.
The Article concludes by recommending that the United States refocus
its position regarding intellectual property matters to promote the public
interest. While the United States certainly may give up some discretion, it
cannot allow narrow economic interests to dictate national policy. Rather,
the United States must ensure that its intellectual property legislation
promotes the progress of science and useful arts.
While the determination
6
may be difficult, it nonetheless must be made. 1
14Kohr, supra note 12, at 22 (listing the motives for the North (developed countries) as:
(1) enabling transnational companies in developed countries to "capture more profits through
monopolistic higher prices and through royalties and the sale of technology products;" and
(2) to put barriers in place to prevent technological development of "potential new rivals
from the South"). Kohr notes the hypocrisy of using "trade liberalization" as the new vehicle
to impose stronger intellectual property laws. He declares that developed countries "would
promote their own commercial interests, whether that meant through liberalization or
protectionism."
15See infra Part II.B. For example, Reichman states that the United States used market
access as a "bargaining chip" to be exchanged for stronger intellectual property protection.
Reichman, supra note 13, at 176.
16We also must move from relying on rhetoric and general theories regarding intellectual
property and conduct the necessary empirical research to demonstrate what is and is not in
the public interest. See Claude E. Barfield, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY: THE
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II. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
A. Increased Worldwide Intellectual Property Protection
In April 1994, countries, including the United States, concluded the
"Uruguay Round" trade negotiations under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). The Uruguay Round Agreements established
the World Trade Organization ("WTO") and include the TRIPS Agreement,
an intellectual property treaty that significantly strengthens intellectual
property rights worldwide. 17 TRIPS has been hailed as "the most far
reaching and comprehensive legal regime ever concluded at the
multinational level in the area of intellectual property rights" and
"unquestionably the most important development in international
intellectual property law [in the last century]."' 8
Prior to TRIPS, countries had widely varying levels of intellectual
property protection and enforcement. Because each country had widely
different and oft times divergent goals, values, history, culture, tradition and
political climate, countries protected intellectual property rights at different
levels. Indeed, some countries provided very little in the way of protection.
Also affecting the scope of intellectual property protections were the
differences in each country's level of economic and technological
development. Quite simply, the benefits and harms of intellectual property
protection depended upon the individual country. These differences remain
today. Despite this, TRIPS mandates that all countries provide intellectual
property protection at certain specified minimum levels. TRIPS' most
significant features include: (1) linking intellectual property rights to trade
for the first time in a multilateral international intellectual property
agreement, and (2) requiring member countries to implement and enforce
minimum standards for protecting intellectual property rights. 9 The impact
FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2001) (arguing that much of international

policy is based on rhetoric, theory and "mantras").
17As of January 2002, the WTO has 144 members. See Integrating Intellectual Property
Rights and Development Policy, Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights,
London, Sept. 2002, at Introduction Box 01, available at www.iprcommission.org (last
visited July 20, 2002) [hereinafter CIPR Report].
18 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT xvii
(Carlos M. Correa and Abdulqawi A.Yusuf eds. 1998); Charles McManis, Intellectual
Propertyand InternationalMergers and Acquisitions, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 1283, 1286 (1998).
TRIPS is considered by many to be a major accomplishment in the effort to harmonize
patent laws throughout the world. Martin J. Adelman & Sonia Baldia, PatentableInventions:
Prospects of Limits of the PatentProvision in the TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India, 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507, 512 (1996) ("The importance of TRIPS cannot be easily
overemphasized.").
19Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Article 1, April
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33

TRIPS Rebound
25:99 (2004)

of these requirements cannot be overstated.
By linking intellectual property to trade, intellectual propertyexporting countries can use GATT's dispute settlement mechanism against
noncomplying member countries. This may involve the imposition of trade
sanctions. TRIPS mandates that all countries party to the agreement revise
their laws to incorporate specified standards of intellectual property
protection. These standards increase the level of intellectual property
protection significantly beyond those previously established in any
international intellectual property treaty.
This section examines TRIPS objectives and a number of the more
important TRIPS patent provisions to illuminate the changes TRIPS
requires of member countries. The following sections then take a more
detailed look at the provisions in the context of how they affect public and
private interests in general and the United States in particular.
1. TRIPS' Objective
TRIPS' objective is to liberalize the international trading system while
protecting the private rights of intellectual property owners by reducing
piracy and misappropriation. 20 Its objective is also to eliminate 'free-riding'
distortions resulting from the fact that some countries did not protect
intellectual property rights.2 1 TRIPS' preamble highlights these objectives
by explicitly referring to the need to protect private interests: "Desiring to
reduce distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking into
account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of
intellectual property rights. 22

I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS]. Enforcement includes trade sanctions, which consists of
compensatory and retaliatory withdrawal of trade concessions and the imposition of tariffs
and quotas.
20TRIPS, supra note 19, art. 7 & Preamble.
21 Id.
22 TRIPS, supra note 19, Preamble. The overarching theme TRIPS was to reduce barriers
to trade by protecting intellectual property rights. TRIPS' title, Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, and the very first line of its Preamble "to reduce
distortions and impediments to international trade [...]" reflects its commitment to trade.
One of its objectives as set forth in its Preamble is: "... the substantial reduction of tariffs
and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international
trade relations." Interestingly, at the turn of the century, intellectual property protection was
thought to inhibit trade. See A. David Demiray, Intellectual Property and the External
Power of the European Community: The New Extension, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 187, 200
(1995).
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2. TRIPS Minimum Standards
a. Patentable Subject Matter
As to TRIPS' required minimum standards, they may not be so
"minimal." TRIPS Article 27's patentable subject matter requires WTO
members to provide patent protection for any invention regardless of the
field of technology. 23 This provision has evoked the most protest, having
the potential for the most far-reaching deleterious effects. "No provision of
the TRIPS Agreement sweeps away national limitations on intellectual
property
protection more completely than the first sentence of Article
24
27(1)."
Article 27 is extremely broad and greatly expands previous agreements
regarding subject matter. Article 27(1)'s first sentence stating that patents
shall be available "in all fields of technology" means that countries cannot
discriminate based on subject matter. For example, developing countries,
many of which previously excluded inventions in fields such as food,
agriculture, and medicines, can no longer maintain such exclusions. Article
27(l)'s first sentence also prevents countries from discriminating against
inventions based on whether they are "processes" or "products. 25
b. Patent Term
Another key minimum standard is TRIPS' patent term.
TRIPS
attempts to harmonize the patent term by providing for a minimum 20-year
term.
The new term is longer than that previously provided by countries,
including the United States, which had a 17-year term.2 7 Moreover,
countries are no longer able to vary the length of patent terms according to
the type of invention. India, for example, had at one point provided for a
five-year term for patent processes on pharmaceuticals while providing
longer terms for other inventions.28 Because of TRIPS' nondiscrimination

23 The relevant portion of TRIPS provides: "Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and
3, patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of
industrial application ....
[P]atents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without
discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are
imported or locally produced." TRIPS, supra note 19, at art. 27(1).
24 PAUL

GOLDSTEIN,

INTERNATIONAL

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

LAW CASES AND

MATERIALS 307 (2001).
25 See infra Part III.B.

26 TRIPS provides: "The term of protection available shall not end before the expiration
of a period of twenty years counted from the filing date." TRIPS, supra note 19, at art. 33
27 The previous U.S. patent term calculated the term from the issuance date, rather than
the filing date. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1993).
28 Adelman & Baldia, supra note 18, at 523.
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clause, member countries are no longer able to legally distinguish in this
manner.
c. Parallel Imports
Parallel importation allows countries to seek lower-priced products
abroad, rather than purchase higher-priced versions from local distributors.
Parallel importation exists as a consequence of price disparity among
different countries' products; this price disparity allows countries to "price
shop" and obtain the lower-priced goods. Prior to TRIPS, countries were
free to do just this, i.e., choose the policy that best advanced their interests.
During the TRIPS negotiations, the controversy over parallel
importation was "intense. 2 9 Developing countries pushed for a standard
that would allow them to continue purchasing the lowest priced drugs from
anywhere in the world. Developed countries pushed for a standard that
would prevent the free movement of goods after the initial sale of the
product. No agreement could be reached. Reflecting this, TRIPS Article 6
states that: "For the purposes of dispute settlement. . . nothing in this
Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of
intellectual property rights." This language allows each country
to choose
3
the system it deems most suitable, thus retaining the status quo. 0
d. Compulsory Licensing
Compulsory licensing was another area of intense TRIPS negotiations.
A compulsory license is a state-granted license issued to a third party to
manufacture and produce a patented invention without the patent owner's
consent.31 As with the other measures, countries' policies regarding the
availability and use of compulsory licensing varied. TRIPS Article 31 sets
forth the framework regarding compulsory licensing. That section, entitled
"Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder," gives countries
broad discretion for government use of compulsory licensing.32 However,
29

Marco C. E. J. Bronckers, The Exhaustion of Patent Rights Under WTO Law, 32 J.

WORLD TRADE 137 (1998).
30This interpretation was challenged by the United States. However, at the 2001 WTO

Ministerial meeting at Doha, Qatar, the Council made clear that Article 6 allows each
country to design their own exhaustion of rights regimes. See Doha Ministerial Declaration,
5(d), WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/ddae/ddae.htm#dohadeclaration (last visited Nov. 4, 2004) [hereinafter Doha
Declaration]; CIPR Report, supra note 17, at 42.
31See, e.g., P. Gorecki, Regulating the Price of Prescription Drugs in Canada:
Compulsory Licensing, Product Selection, and Government Reimbursement Programs,

(Economic Council of Canada, 1981) (defining a compulsory license as "an involuntary
contract between a willing buyer and an unwilling seller imposed and enforced by the
state.").
32 Arguably, countries also might justify compulsory licenses based on a public-interest
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while the grounds on which a government can grant a compulsory license
are not limited, TRIPS contains numerous conditions that must be met
before the government can authorize licenses. Three of the main conditions
are that, as a general rule: (1) an effort should be made to negotiate a
voluntary license on reasonable commercial terms;33 (2) the government
must provide "adequate remuneration" to the right holder; 34 and (3) the
license use must be "predominantly for the supply of the domestic
market., 35 Other conditions include: (1) the scope and duration of the
license must be limited to the purpose of the authorization; 36 (2) the license
is non-exclusive and is generally non-transferable; (3) the license is
terminated when "the circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are
unlikely to recur;" and (4) the government's decision is subject to

independent judicial review.37

Thus, while governments can grant

compulsory licensing, they cannot do so with unfettered discretion but must
comply with these sometimes onerous conditions.
By adopting TRIPS, each country had to implement all of the above
changes. For some countries, the changes were minimal. For others, these
requirements resulted in drastic changes in their intellectual property laws.
38
B. The Next Frontier: TRIPS-Plus ("Pigging out at the IP trough")

The full impact of TRIPS is only now becoming clear. Although
TRIPS had been touted as a vehicle for economic development, foreign
direct investment, technology transfer, and increased market access to

exception, art. 8(1), and as a means to prevent abuses by intellectual property rights holders,
art. 8(2). Compulsory licenses based on these principles still must be consistent with Article
31. TRIPS, supra note 19.
33This requirement may be waived in case of "national emergency," "other
circumstances of extreme urgency," or "in cases of public non-commercial use." TRIPS,
supra note 19, art. 31. These exceptions allow a government to bypass the step of negotiating
compensation with the patent holder in the interests of expediency. In 2002, Zimbabwe
invoked this exception to override patents on antiretroviral drugs in response to the AIDS
crisis gripping the country. Medecins Sans Frontieres, Zimbabwe Government Takes
Emergency Action Against HIV/AIDS (May 29, 2002), available at http://www.msf.org (last
visited Aug. 17, 2003).
34TRIPS, supra note 19, art. 3 1(h).
" Id. art. 31(f).
36 Id. art. 3 1(c).

37Id. art. 31(f). Other bases for compulsory licenses include the need to correct anti-

competitive practices and in preventing blocking patents. Id. at art 31 (k) and (1). The detailed
set of conditions do not apply when anti-competitive practices are being remedied. Id art.
31 (k).
38This phrase is taken from Professor Robert Merges' article about the 1998 Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act. Robert Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude:
Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2233 (2000). It applies just as well to
TRIPS and TRIPS-plus.
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developed world markets for agriculture and textiles, it has not
demonstrably improved conditions for the developing world.
The
perceived long-term benefits have not yet materialized and indeed are
questionable. 39 The short-term disadvantages are not.
Developing
countries must cope with TRIPS' monopolization effects and increases in
costs associated with implementing and enforcing a new intellectual
property system.4 °
What is most troubling about the TRIPS regime from the perspective
of a developing country (and, as will be argued, the United States) is that
even before countries can come to terms with current TRIPS problems,
TRIPS proponents are pushing onward. Extending the period of protection,
achieving equal treatment for all technologies, and limiting the use of
compulsory licensing were just the beginning. Many developed countries
are driving for recognition of even broader rights in intellectual property,
commonly referred to as "TRIPS-plus." TRIPS-plus includes a ban on
compulsory licensing and parallel imports; pipeline protection for
inventions still under development; no early registration or stockpiling of
generic drugs before the patent expires; and liberal patent extension rules.4 1
The logic of TRIPS-plus is that if strong intellectual property rights are
good, even stronger protection is better.
C. The United States: The Big Winner?
In contrast to developing countries, the United States, in one sense, is
the big winner with TRIPS, as it will receive rent (royalties) in the range of
billions a year.
Maskus calculated that the United States would
overwhelmingly gain the most income in terms of "static rent transfers"
with an estimated increased rent net inflow of $5.8 billion per year;
Germany was next with less than $1 billion.42 Maskus attributes this inflow
"to the fact that U.S.-headquartered firms owned numerous patents in many
countries that were required by TRIPS to upgrade their intellectual property

39See McManis, supra note 18, at 1286-97.
40

See TRIPS, supra note 19, arts. 41-61 (regarding civil and administrative procedures

that countries must make available for intellectual property rights holders).
41 Heinz Klug, Patents and Pandemics: Can South Africa Survive Legal Harmonization,
paper presented at the Rutgers University (Camden) law faculty speakers series, Camden,
Feb. 12, 2001 at 9.
42 Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development, 32 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 471, 493 (2000) [hereinafter Maskus, Economic Development]. Maskus
qualifies his calculations as being inherently sum-zero and static. McCalman, whose work
Maskus builds upon, worked out the required changes in patent laws as measured by the
index developed by Ginarte and Park in 1997. Maskus then applied these changes to 1998
patent portfolios owned by each country to determine how TRIPS and the stronger patent
laws would affect the transfer of rents if TRIPS had been in place. Id. at 476-477.
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protection. ' The calculations represent only "what the additional income
on existing patents would have been under TRIPS."" The latest estimate,
by the World Bank, also suggests that most developed countries would be
the major beneficiaries of TRIPS in terms of the enhanced value of their
patents, with the benefit to the U.S. estimated at an annual $19 billion.45
Developing countries, and a few developed nations, would be the net losers.
The country sustaining the largest loss in the World Bank study was Korea
($15 billion).46
It is possible to read too much into the meaning of these figures, which
depend on a number of debatable assumptions, but it can safely be said that
scholars agree the effect of strengthening intellectual property rights
globally will considerably benefit the holders of intellectual property rights,
mainly in developed countries, at the expense of the users of protected
technologies and goods in developing countries. However, for the United
States, the numbers do not tell the entire story. The inflow of money to a
narrow few is only one aspect of TRIPS. The full effect of TRIPS also
involves the loss of sovereignty and the future retardation of technological
development.
III. TRIPS REBOUND
TRIPS' and TRIPS-plus' emphasis on stronger intellectual property
will not only exacerbate problems for developing countries, but also harm
the United States. A rebound effect will result from the fact that, as a WTO
signatory, the United States will have to strengthen its intellectual property
regime to comply with TRIPS and possibly TRIPS-plus. By doing so, the
United States relinquishes its sovereign power regarding intellectual
property laws. In other words, it relinquishes its power to enact intellectual
property laws consistent with the constitutional mandate of promoting the
progress of the useful arts and science. The rebound effect also results from
the inconsistent focus of U.S. intellectual property law and TRIPS. It is not
clear that the TRIPS revisions meet the constitutional mandate of promoting
the public interest. It is even less clear that the proposed TRIPS-plus
revisions do.

43 Id.

44id.
45World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 2002, World

Bank, 133 (2001), at http://www.worldbank.org/prospects/gep2002/.
46 id.
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A. TRIPS Results in Loss of Sovereignty over Intellectual Property
1. Sovereignty
Sovereignty is about decision-making.47 It refers to a state's unlimited
power, which is subject to only those rules of international law that the state
has expressly accepted.48
Neither other states nor international
organizations such as the WTO have any right to intervene in matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of that state.49
47 "[T]he first explicitly formulated doctrine of sovereignty" was in Jean Bodin's 1576
De Republica. See STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 27 (Gerard

Kriejen, et al. eds. 2002) [hereinafter,

INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE].

Bodin's idea of

sovereignty, which represented the situation of States in Europe during that time, was
"originally conceived as a source of strength and power for the State with a view to
confining this status to institutions that did in fact enjoy this kind of power .. " Id.
Decision-making can occur on vertical and horizontal levels. "The vertical allocation
involves which level of social organization should decide. In particular, what amount of
deference should be granted to national regulation vis-A-vis supranational rules? The
horizontal allocation involves choices between political and administrative processes, global
market processes and international judicial processes." Gregory Shaffer, Power and Global
Governance: The Need for A Comparative InstitutionalApproach, in POWER AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 12 (Michael Barnett & Bud Duvall eds.) (Cambridge University Press,
forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter Shaffer, Global Governance]. Here, we deal exclusively with
vertical decision-making (i.e., the United States vs. the WTO).
48 Barfield identifies two separate categories of sovereignty: (1) Westphalian sovereignty;
and (2) interdependence. Westphalian sovereignty refers to excluding "foreign actors from
domestic decision-making." Interdependence concerns a nation's ability to control the
"cross-border movement of goods, services, capital, labor, and information." Barfield, supra
note 16, at 8.
49 "Neither other States nor [international organizations such as the WTO] have any right
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a State."
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 47, at 185. The difference between sovereignty
and international governance, which is defined by the OECD "as the process by which we
collectively manage and govern resources, issues, conflicts and values in a world that is
increasingly a 'global neighbourhood,"' (quoting OECD/GD(96)64, Globalisation: What
Challenges and Opportunities for Governments (1996)) can be viewed as "one of degree and
gradation along a spectrum." Id. at 4. At one end of the spectrum is the notion that the world
is made up of individual states that operate without--or with very little-thought of its
actions on other states. At the other end is the notion that the world is made up of individual
states that are interdependent and have common values and problems that can be solved only
through common efforts, with respect for universal legal rules. Along these lines, Marcel
Brus argues that "governance of world affairs [and conflicts] can no longer be based on
purely voluntary cooperation of sovereign States, but will be based on shared normative
concepts .
" I.Id. Of course, the reality is that the world community is somewhere in
between. See generally Shaffer, Global Governance, supra note 47, at 2 (citing Neil Walker,
The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalismin a New Key, in THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL
AND CONSTITUTIONAL IssuEs 33 (Grainne de Burca and Joanne Scott eds., 2001).
The interplay between sovereignty and international governance raises a host of questions,
many of which are beyond the scope of this article. As pertinent here, however, because
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international governance gives a "central place to values" as the basis for delegating to the
international community collective decision-making authority, the question becomes: What
are the issues upon which states share common values? While difficult to identify, generally,
these issues are matters that because of their affect on other states become matters that must
be solved within the international community. Such matters may include human rights,
genocide, apartheid, systematic killing of people, ethnic cleansing, torture, nuclear energy
and weapons, labor, and the environment. It can be argued that while there is consensus that
the international community must speak to issues such as human rights, genocide, ethnic
cleansing, etc., countries do not share common values with respect to them. Issues within
these categories upon which there is no consensus include, for example, the death penalty,
mutilation of female genitalia, child labor, and the cause and effects of global warming.
On the other hand, if values are not shared amongst the individual countries, conflict arises
which can or cannot be resolved. As a result, individual values either must grow towards
each other or the international community must adopt rules that deal with the unavoidable
conflict. With respect to intellectual property, values are intensely different.
Oversimplifying, there is a sharp division between, on the one hand, treating intellectual
property as the preservation of the "cultural heritage of mankind," where creations form the
"accumulatedmaterial heritage of humankind as a whole" and all persons in society enjoy
free access to these creations and on the other hand treating intellectual property as creative
works of individual artists, providing for "the right of individuals to freely create their
cultural 'oeuvres', with no restrictions." Rosemary J. Coombe, Intellectual Property,Human
Rights & Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in InternationalLaw Posed By the Recognition of
IndigenousKnowledge and the Conversation ofBiodiversity, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
59, 73, 76 (1998). Coombe distinguishes the two views based on the meaning of the term
"culture." She contends that the term has different meanings in the international human
rights arena and these differences are at the heart of the various debates about the appropriate
scope and level of intellectual property rights protection. Id. at 72-73. The former view relies
on communal sharing and the passing down of cultural tradition, while the latter view places
an emphasis, indeed an insistence, on individual authorship as the hallmark of intellectual
property protection. Id. at 76. Coombe identifies a third understanding of culture, which is
"the material and spiritual activities, products, meanings, and values of a given social group
that distinguish it from other groups." Id. at 73 (citing Asbjrn Eide & Allan Rosas,
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Universal Challenge, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 230 (Eide et al. eds., 1995)). Coombe refers to this
understanding as an "anthropological" meaning. Developing countries are more inclined to
view intellectual property under a common heritage of mankind notion while developed
countries view it under a protecting creative works of individual artist approach. This is of
course an extreme generalization. There are developing countries that treat intellectual
property under the individuality approach. There also is often an overlap in individual
countries in the manner they treat intellectual property. The point is that there is no one view
towards intellectual property held by all countries and thus no "common values" regarding it.
We thus can legitimately question whether intellectual property is a matter that reflects
shared values appropriate for international governance. Marcel Brus, The Authority of Law in
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 47, at 5. Cf. Coombe, supra note 49, at 115 ("As a
consequence of the Uruguay Rounds, State sovereignty over IPRs no longer appears
especially significant in terms of ensuring that intellectual property protections meet
domestic public interests.").
Beyond these questions, others remain. Such questions involve implementation and
enforcement of international norms, i.e., determining how best to have individual states
adopt policies resolving "community issues," and assuring that states not only implement but
also enforce these universal policies. Related, what is the best way to promote or achieve
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The reason for jealously guarding sovereign power should be readily
apparent. States are in the best position to address constituent, domestic
concerns.
As Professor Shaffer notes, "participation in democratic
decision-making at the national level is of a much higher quality" because
of, among other things, the closer relation between citizen and state. s o
Surrendering authority to address essentially domestic concerns could result
in these concerns either going unaddressed or unsatisfactorily resolved.
Here again Shaffer notes that "international procedures are generally
unsuited to respond to local norms, needs, and conditions." 51 Moreover,
"serious biases" inherent in the international political processes militate
against delegating decision-making authority to the international
community. 52
Intellectual property has traditionally been a matter within the
exclusive jurisdiction of individual nation-states. In the United States, for
example, the court in Robertson v. GeneralElectric53 observed:
Patent rights differ from many other rights which are the subject of
treaties, in that they are created by and dependent upon statutes which
only Congress has the power to enact.
Furthermore, a right under a patent is not one which extends across
national boundaries, and is therefore necessarily a matter for regulation
by treatl, but is one which may be enjoyed within the territory of the
nation.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century this sentiment was
understandable, as the world community was styled as a group of individual
and sovereign nation-states, instead of an interdependent community.
Changes in international society, however, have changed views regarding
allocating decision-making authority.
In particular, the post WWII period saw a rise in efforts to retain (or
gain) sovereign powers, in large part because the many newly decolonized
states equated sovereignty with freedom.5 5 Now, in the post-colonial, postthese common values? And, finally, in cases where there are no shared or common values,
do we defer to the States or to the international community to resolve these conflicts?
50Shaffer, Global Governance, supra note 47, at 20. Shaffer also notes that the reduced
cost of organization and participation and common identity and "communal cohesiveness"
contribute to the higher quality of decision-making.
51id.
52 Id

53Robertson v. General Electric Co., 32 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1929).
54Id.at 500.

'5In the 1930s sovereignty was thought of as an "obstacle to the development of
international law." To better advance international law, many believed States had to
surrender their sovereignty. INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 47, at 29.
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cold war period, with the new globalized economy and technological
advances we again are redefining sovereignty. 56 While the traditional,
nationalist view remains dominant, 57 this article presents a different
perspective. The view here is that the traditional position of intellectual
property rights is more form over substance.58 TRIPS has transformed
intellectual property rights into internationally governed rights, leaving
what seems like very little discretion to sovereign states.59
The traditional view is premised on the fact that intellectual property
owners' right to protect their property in a foreign country depends on
whether the foreign country's domestic laws recognize such a right. The
foreign country's national laws determine the nature of such rights even if
those laws are constrained by the country's obligations under international
intellectual property law.60 Because TRIPS is a non self-executing treaty,6'

in order to comply with its provisions, countries including the United States
must enact implementing legislation. Thus, because countries must still
enact implementing legislation they retain their sovereign power over
intellectual property. In this sense, intellectual property is indeed territorial.
TRIPS changes this.
First, countries were successful in bringing TRIPS and intellectual
property under GATT/WTO by labeling intellectual property as traderelated, asserting that inadequate protection of intellectual property rights in
developing countries had trade-distorting effects.62 By becoming WTO
members, countries are required to accept the whole body of agreements
56 A different problem associated with sovereignty is how to think of States that are
sovereign in the independent sense, but are in fact lacking sovereign power either because
the government is not responsive to its citizens or because it is being run by warlords or
individuals who are behaving irresponsibly. Id. at 29-30. This problem is not addressed
here.
57 D'Amato & Long, supra note 8, at 233.
58 The global and interdependent world have made scholars question whether the
traditional territoriality view regarding intellectual property remains viable. Id
59 Some argue that sovereignty is a myth because in fact, "most, if not indeed all,
sovereign governments nowadays have very seriously limited choices in the exercise of their
supposedly sovereign competence, because their theoretically important areas for decisions
are much restricted and hemmed in by treaties, by customary international law, and by the
consequences, and especially the economic consequences, of the sheer interdependence of
all sovereign States of today." INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 47, at 31.
60 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, William 0. Hennessey, Shira Perlmutter, INTERNATIONAL

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

LAW

AND

POLICY

28 (2001)

[hereinafter Dinwoodie,

INTERNATIONAL IP] ("intellectual property laws operate territorially, and intellectual property
rights are thus national in scope.").
61 "Self-executing treaties... do not require implementing legislation [and] automatically
become effective as domestic law immediately upon entry into force." Non self-executing
treaties need implementing legislation and then it is the legislation, not the treaty, "that is the
law of the land," unless the legislation simply incorporates the treaty. See id. at 61-62.
62 See infra Part III.B.2.c.
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that are administered by the WTO, including TRIPS. The agreements are a
"package deal. 63 Countries became WTO members, and accepted TRIPS,
not as much for what TRIPS offered but because they perceived that they
would be worse off without the WTO. 64 This had a profound effect on how
countries treated intellectual property. The scope of discretion member

countries were permitted to exercise was significantly constrained.
Second, TRIPS establishes minimum standards that far exceed
previous standards. 65 Thus, even though a country has discretion to provide
more protection than that required by TRIPS, it does not have discretion to
provide less protection.66 This is viewed "as a drive to overcome
preexisting territorial limitations on intellectual property rights. 6 7 In other
words, it was intended to reduce the amount of discretion countries
exercised regarding TRIPS provisions.
Under these circumstances,
countries lose sovereign power within the minimum standards set by
TRIPS.68

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, TRIPS adds to the minimum
substantive standards minimum enforcement standards of a given member's
international obligations. 69 These enforcement standards are in place at
both national and international levels. Nationally, TRIPS requires enhanced
63

Previously, countries would be bound by only those agreements they chose to ratify.

INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 47, at 185. Thus, for example, under GATT,
countries would individually negotiate each tariff reduction or trade-reducing barrier;
countries could agree to different elements of GATT without being bound by GATT's other
provisions. Klug, supra note 41, at 18.
6 Shaffer, Global Governance, supra note 47, at 8. The obvious harm in not becoming a
WTO member is the loss of trade concessions, national treatment, and most-favored nation
status. "The risk of exclusion can induce developing countries to agree to comply with
international
rules that may contravene their interests such as the TRIPs Agreement ..... Id.
65
See supra Part II.A.
66 This is of course if the country decides to become a member of the WTO. The country
could also become a member without complying with TRIPS provisions but, as explained
later, the sanctions that can be applied against a noncomplying member makes this option
unattractive.
67 D'Amato & Long, supranote 8, at 237.
68 The sovereignty argument is based on the premise that intellectual property is a matter
that should be left within a state's decision-making process. But see id. at 374-375. On the
other hand, there are situations where states must cede some control. In these circumstances,
countries must balance sovereignty against grants of authority over their economic and social
policy to international organizations such as the WTO. INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra
note 47, at 3-4. Paradoxically, by assuming international legal obligations by entering into a
treaty such as TRIPS, countries both manifest sovereignty and at the same time restrict their
sovereignty. Id. at 424. Of course, "consent to be bound by a treaty limits a State's
sovereignty no further than follows from the correct interpretation of the terms of the treaty."
Id. at 16. States can also forfeit sovereign power, e.g., by massively violating the rights of an
ethnic minority as in Kosovo in the 1990s.
69 Part III of the TRIPS Agreement concerns procedures and remedies to be provided at
the national level for the enforcement of intellectual property rights.
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domestic legal procedures.7 ° Internationally, TRIPS makes compliance
subject to the WTO dispute settlement procedures, which authorize
retaliation against countries failing to comply with WTO/TRIPS provisions.
More specifically, the rules allow members to use and threaten to invoke
the WTO remedy of withdrawing trade concessions. 71 This puts enormous
pressure on countries to enact TRIPS legislation and then to comply with
such legislation. The highly efficient WTO settlement dispute system and
the very real threat of retaliatory trade sanctions make talk of the
territoriality of intellectual property laws ring hollow. 72 Not seeking WTO
membership is not a truly viable option for the great majority of countries
because they would be forced to forego all the trading benefits contingent
on membership. Neither is disregard for TRIPS' requirements in light of
the harsh retaliatory sanctions that could be imposed. In reality, TRIPS
transforms intellectual property from a domestic matter to a matter for
international governance.7 3
2. Consequences of the United States' Loss of Sovereignty
Relinquishing sovereignty over intellectual property law to the WTO
has obvious consequences for developing countries with little or no
bargaining power.7 4 What may be less obvious are the consequences for the
These include civil and administrative procedures and remedies, other provisional
measures to prevent infringement of intellectual property rights, and special requirements
related to border measures. See TRIPS, arts. 41-60. TRIPS also provides for criminal
procedures. TRIPS, supranote 19, art. 61.
71 Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for
Developing Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies,2003, available at
http://www.ictsd.org, at 7. [hereinafter, Shaffer, WTO Dispute Settlement] (Working Draft
Feb. 14, 2003. This article is part of a larger ongoing project according to nI.)
72 But cf David Palmeter, NationalSovereignty and the World Trade Organization, 2 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 77, 90 (1999) (arguing that failure of a member to comply with its
WTO obligations results in a cancellation of the bargain to do so, which does not amount to
a loss of sovereignty; rather, the complaining party, i.e., the party that wins a WTO dispute,
is the party that loses sovereignty because that party is restrained from deciding how to react
to the action of the breaching party, the complaining party must limit itself to withdrawing
trade concessions).
73 Even assuming countries believed intellectual property was an appropriate subject for
international governance, one may legitimately conclude that in granting international
organizations such as the WTO authority over domestic affairs, countries, particularly
developing countries, believed that the WTO would act in a relatively just or quasidemocratic manner. These countries' hope was that the WTO would give due weight to that
particular state's interests while also considering other states' interests. Many have
questioned whether the WTO is in fact such an organization. Barfield argues that the WTO
lacks democratic legitimacy because of the imbalance between its rule-making procedures
and effective dispute settlement procedures. In effect, the dispute settlement panels create
law which often is biased in favor of developed countries. Barfield, supra note 16, at 7.
74 See INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 47, at 517. Note also that developing
70
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United States. 75 These consequences can be grouped into two categories.
The first relates to the inappropriateness of having the WTO dictate U.S.
intellectual property law. The second set of consequences relates to
increased intellectual property protection, as required by TRIPS, and
whether this increased protection in fact promotes the progress of science
and useful arts, as required by the Constitution. Because the WTO arguably
has been captured by industries seeking stronger intellectual property laws,
these industries can make an "end run" around Congress. In other words,
these industries may be able to obtain favorable legislation in the WTOand ultimately in the United States-that they could not have obtained
directly in the United States because the legislation does not promote
progress. Although there are highly persuasive arguments that TRIPS
therefore does not promote "progress," the aim of this article is not simply
to demonstrate that the TRIPS' revision of U.S. intellectual property law is
unconstitutional.7 6 Rather, it is to argue that we must in fact determine
whether TRIPS implementing legislation promotes the progress of science
and useful arts.
As to the first category-the inappropriateness of having the WTO
dictate U.S. intellectual property policy-the Constitution directs Congress
to decide intellectual property issues: "Congress shall have the power ...to

Promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors, the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries., 77 This Clause is clear: Congress has the power
countries previously had low level of protection for intellectual property, if they had
protection at all. See also Shaffer, WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 71, for a good
discussion on how the WTO's Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (Dispute Settlement Understanding or "DSU") harms developing
countries. For developing countries, the question is not only how to balance sovereignty with
international governance but also when moving to the arena of international governance how
to ensure that dominant States do not frustrate less powerful States' "legitimate aspirations to
social and economic development." INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 47, at 18.
Also, although sovereignty can be seen as exchanging internal for international power, in the
case of LDCs, there is less of a true exercise of economic sovereignty because the LDC is
severely constrained by the lack of economic power in the legal system of the world trade
order. Id. at 497-98.
75On the other hand, one could argue that because of the United States' power in global
governance it is less likely that it will suffer as much loss of sovereign power. See, e.g.,
Shaffer, WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 71. This view does not adequately distinguish
between the decision makers at the different vertical levels of the United States and WTO.
76 "No provision in any treaty has been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court and
few have been seriously challenged there." Louis Henkin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
UNITED STATES CONSTrrTUTION 185 (1996) [hereinafter Henkin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS]. But see
accompanying notes, id. (regarding commentators challenging the constitutionality of certain
provisions).
77 U.S. CONST. Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). In Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186
(2003), the Supreme Court did not consider whether this preamble of the Clause placed a
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and the duty to determine the scope of U.S. intellectual property rights.
This applies equally to domestic intellectual property laws as to
international intellectual property obligations, which are implemented
through domestic laws. Thus, delegating to, or placing decision-making in

the WTO is constitutionally suspect.
The problems of placing decision-making authority in the WTO are
exacerbated by the difficulty of amending or interpreting WTO law through

the rigid WTO political process. "Unlike national or EC law, WTO law
requires consensus to modify, so that the WTO political/legislative system
remains extremely weak., 78 Moreover, "[c]hanges in WTO rules only take
place through infrequent negotiating rounds (held around once per decade),
involving complex tradeoffs between over one hundred and forty countries
with widely varying interests, values, levels of development and
priorities. ' 79 This results in WTO members delegating significant de facto
power to the WTO dispute settlement process.
It also results in
intellectual property protection being enshrined in international agreements
such as TRIPS and makes it near impossible to change.
The TRIPS' Doha Declaration is a prime example. In November
2001, when the WTO Fourth Ministerial Conference met in Doha, Qatar,
the WTO clarified that TRIPS was not to stand in the way of developing

countries regulating public health matters.8 1 The ministers confirmed that
developing countries could set aside patents in the interest of public health
and agreed that a solution must be found to allow developing countries with
limited or no manufacturing capability to make effective use of TRIPS'

compulsory licensing provisions.

The ministers left the details to be

substantive limit on Congress' legislative power, as petitioners apparently did not argue this
point, but the Court nevertheless found that the "preambular language identifies the sole end
to which Congress may legislate," i.e., to "promote the Progress of Science." The Court
concluded that the Copyright Term Extension Act did promote the progress of science. Id. at
211-12. Even so, the Court stressed that this was a determination properly left to Congress.
Id. at 212.
78 Shaffer, WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 71, at 9. Schott and Watal note that the
GATT also was operated by consensus but point out that the systems are different because
the WTO has more active participants representing more diverse interests and objectives and
WTO members are compelled to abide by all of the negotiated agreements, whether or not
they were part of the negotiation. See Jeffrey J. Schott and Jayashree Watal, Decision
Making in the WTO, in THE WTO AFTER SEATTLE 283-85 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2000).
79 Shaffer, WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 71, at 9-10. To exacerbate matters, there
is considerably less transparency in the WTO process, as many negotiations involve
"backroom dealing." See generally Barfield, supra note 16.
80Barfield, supra note 16, at 1. Moreover, the WTO is seen as having an imbalance
between its "consensus-plagued, inefficient rule-making procedures and its highly efficient
dispute settlement system." This creates an organization that legislates through adjudication;
hence, dispute settlement judgments can add or diminish WTO members' rights and
obligations.
81Doha Declaration, supra note 30 6; see also infra Part V.B.
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decided in the next negotiating round and set December 2002 as the
compliance deadline.
WTO members were unable to agree to rules allowing developing

countries to use compulsory licensing to import essential medicines. 8

In

short, the impasse centered on which countries could take advantage of the
rules and which diseases would be covered. The developing countries (and
many developed countries, excluding the United States) noted that the Doha
Declaration was all-encompassing, allowing countries to import affordable
medicines for any condition that undermines public health.
The United
States sought a narrower interpretation that would limit the list of covered
diseases to malaria, tuberculosis, and AIDS, and also sought to limit the
countries qualified to rely on the provision to the poorest developing
countries. 8 - Solutions to this impasse included either amending TRIPS or
re-interpreting certain TRIPS provisions. 85 The implementation deadline
passed with no solution.8 6
WTO decision-making has further problems. In certain circumstances,
not only will TRIPS constrain Congress' ability to pass intellectual property
laws, but in turn, it will bind the United States because of a lack of effective
82

See Sarah Boseley and Charlotte Denny, Prescription for World's Poorest Stays

Unwritten: WTO Conference Deadlock as U.S. Shows No Signs of Loosening Veto on
Pharmaceutical Patent Rights, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 20, 2003, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/intemational/story/0,,899073,00.html.
83The developing countries (and many developed countries, excluding the United States)
noted that "the Doha declaration was all-encompassing, [allowing countries to import]
affordable medicines for any condition which undermines public health." Id.
84 id.

85At least five main solutions have been proposed: (1) delete Article 31(0; (2) interpret
Article 30 to provide for compulsory licensing as not conflicting with the "normal
exploitation of the patent;" (3) declare a moratorium or waiver for exports in the "Doha
circumstances;" (4) interpret TRIPS such that settlement disputes would not be used in
relation to exports as envisioned under the Doha Declaration; and (5) permit countries with
manufacturing and reverse engineering capabilities to issue compulsory licenses in
accordance with their own legislation and offer export to developing countries a proportion
of the manufactured supplies. CIPR Report, supra note 17, at 47-48.
86 At the September 2003 Cancun ministerial meeting the stalemate finally ended. The
WTO members adopted an interpretive decision that allows any WTO member to
manufacture and export patented medicines under a compulsory license to certain
developing and least developed countries ("eligible importing members"). WTO, Decision of
the General Counsel of 30 August 2003, Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health (Sept. 1, 2003), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/implemjpara6_e.htm. While "[tihe details of
this decision are both complex and technical, and include several side statements in which
specific countries have unilaterally agreed to refrain from acting either as importers or as
exporters," in short, the decision allows least developed countries to import drugs without
restriction as to the type of disease. See id.; Laurence R. Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs
Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1, 67 (2004).
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judicial review. The United States Supreme Court may be unwilling to
"second-guess" Congress in this area, distorting crucial checks and
balances. The Eldred v. Ashcroft case highlights this point. Eldred
involved a constitutional challenge to the Copyright Term Extension Act
(CTEA). The CTEA increased the copyright term for existing and future
copyrights by 20 years (for a total term of "life-plus 70 years"). In part, the
CTEA was passed to satisfy the United States' international copyright
obligations. In reaching its decision that the CTEA was constitutional, the
Eldred majority was concerned about intruding on Congress' decisionmaking authority regarding intellectual property. The Court stated that in
such matters it had to "defer substantially to Congress," and stressed "that it
is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the
Copyright Clause's objectives." 87 Thus, despite the CTEA's questionable
public benefit, the Court remarked that it was "not at liberty to secondguess congressional determination and policy judgments of this order,
however debatable or arguably unwise they may be." 88 It is a problem
when Congress cannot effectively question the constitutionality of
intellectual property laws. It is aggravated when the Supreme Court also
cannot.
Moreover, Congress must constantly monitor United States'
intellectual property laws to shape those laws based on history, experience
and theory. Perceptions and contexts change with time and experience.
Congress should have the ability8 to change laws consistent with these
changed perceptions and contexts.8 9 The patent regime, for example, is a
balance between the costs of innovation and the benefits derived therefrom.
Congress grants patents when the benefits outweigh the costs. When
implementing legislation, Congress must be able to reassess this balance
based on experience, further thought, and new information. This is an
ongoing process. This is a process that is best not left to the unyielding
WTO legislative process.
Further, the WTO balances different interests than those required by
the Constitution. The Constitution places limits on foreign affairs as it does

87Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (citing Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207,

230 (1990)).
881d. at 208. See also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990) ("This evolution of the
duration of copyright protection tellingly illustrates the difficulties Congress faces... It is
not our role to alter the delicate balance Congress has labored to achieve."); Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 474 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) ("[I]t is Congress that has
been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted
to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their work
product.").
89This should include the flexibility to readjust the balance between public and private
interests when necessary.
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on other government action. 90 Treaties such as TRIPS are subject to the
constitutional limitations that apply to all exercises of federal power. 91 In
other words, TRIPS cannot extend "so far as to authorize what the
Constitution forbids., 92 The Constitution requires that TRIPS'
implementing legislation promote the progress of science and the useful
arts. The WTO may not (indeed, likely will not) balance the very interests
the Constitution requires. Technically, it could be said that TRIPS balances
TRIPS balances developing
private interests against public interests.
countries' needs in technology transfer against developed countries' needs
to guard against piracy. However, these are not the domestic public
interests the United States must consider. Such interests include domestic
access to goods and knowledge and appropriate limits on intellectual
property rights. By implementing TRIPS, Congress may be embracing
norms that have a different focus than the Intellectual Property Clause.
Further, the WTO is a multi-issue institution. As such, it must handle
many issues, including trade, intellectual property, goods, services, and
investment measures. The WTO must take into account the needs of over
145 other countries. Inevitably, these countries' divergent policies will
conflict with U.S. intellectual property law. Indeed, U.S. intellectual
property law and European intellectual property law developed in different
legal and political backgrounds, and thus will promote different interests,
values, and goals.93 U.S. intellectual property law should not be dependent
upon world trade law or other countries' intellectual property policies, even
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) ("It would be manifestly contrary to the
objectives of those who created the Constitution ...to construe Article VI [the Supremacy
Clause] as permitting the United States to exercise power under an international agreement
without observing constitutional prohibitions."). Some have urged, however, that courts
should refuse to hear such cases under the political question doctrine. See, e.g., Henkin,
90

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 76, at 457 n.45.
91Henkin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 76, at 185; cf Potter, Inhibitions Upon the
Treaty-Making Power of the United States, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 456 (1934) (Treaty is not
subject to constitutional limitations because the Constitution cannot effectively limit the
treaty power of a sovereign nation.).
92 Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 616, 620 (1871) ("It need hardly be said that a treaty cannot change the Constitution
or be held valid if it be in violation of that instrument."); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. 635, 637
(1854); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (More precisely relevant here, TRIPS
enacting legislation also cannot extend beyond constitutional limits.).
93Peter K. Yu, Four Remaining Questions About Copyright Law After Eldred, (Feb.
2003), at www.GigaLaw.com/articles/2003-all/yu-2003-02-all.html (last visited Oct. 31,
2004) ("While European copyright law was developed from an author's right (droit
d'auteur) tradition, which covers both personal and economic rights, American copyright
law emerged from a utilitarian tradition, which emphasized primarily economic rights."). Yu
notes that the United States and the EU have "strong disagreements" over such copyright
issues as the first sale doctrine, moral rights, and work-made-for-hire arrangements, among
others.
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if it recognizes and attempts to reconcile such policies.
Lastly, all of this suggests that TRIPS constrains the United States'
own internal debates about the appropriate balance in intellectual property
law so as to advance the public interest. Recent litigation involving
Napster 94 and Kazaa, 95 as well as Eldred 6 and recent legislative proposals
have dramatically increased domestic public awareness of intellectual
property issues. There are fierce debates raging within the United States
about the appropriate level of intellectual property protection regarding,
inter alia, prescription and generic drugs, 97 compulsory licensing, patent
and copyright terms, and, in general, the scope of intellectual property.
These debates cannot be framed with the international community first in
mind, but instead must be done with the U.S. public first in mind.
Complying with TRIPS without engaging in these debates, and, more
importantly, without resolving these debates based on internal politics,
holds a great potential to harm the United States.
B. TRIPS Is Inconsistent With Traditional U.S. Intellectual Property
Policy: To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts
1. The United States'PatentSystem was Designedto Advance the Public
Interest of Promotingthe Progressof Useful Arts
The problems above should be sufficient to make one wary of
delegating intellectual property matters to the WTO, even if WTO decision
making were consistent with U.S. intellectual property policy. But it is not.
The problems previously identified are intensified by the inconsistencies
between WTO policy and U.S. policy. This is the second arm of the
rebound effect. To better appreciate the inconsistency, we must compare
the United States' approach to national patent law with TRIPS. 99 This
section provides a brief overview of United States patent law. It identifies
some of the early factors that influenced the law, then focuses on the chief
94 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).
95 Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal.

2003).
96 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212.
97 See infra Part III.C.
98 Id.

99 See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945). The patent
system comprises the patent laws and the customs, practices, and interpretations. It should be
noted here that while this section refers to "law" in the general sense of legislative
enactments, it also refers to law as judicial interpretation of those enactments, even where
there are no specific "laws." Much was done by judicial interpretation rather than legislative
modification. Thus, for example, even though there are not specific laws providing for
general compulsory licensing (other than government use), there is no doubt this remedy is
part of United States patent law.
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factor - advancing the public interest by promoting "the progress of science
and useful arts."' 10 This emphasis on the public interest, grounded in the
Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution, is achieved through
encouraging the widest possible access to inventions for the public and in
promoting the widest possible dissemination of knowledge to the public.
This section traces the history and underpinning of U.S. patent law
showing, in general, the role the public interest has played. The following
section then looks again at TRIPS, this time to evaluate whether TRIPS'
focus is inconsistent with the United States' historical focus.
a. Promoting the Public Interest: The Intellectual Property Clause
The United States patent system can trace its origins to the 1474
Venetian patent system,1 1 England's 1624 Statute of Monopolies, 10 2 and
100While this article focuses exclusively on patent law, as should be expected the
copyright laws also have as their primary purpose the public benefit. See generally DAVIES,
supra note 2, at 125 ("Within reasonable limits, the interests of authors coincide with those
of the public. Both will usually benefit from the widest possible dissemination of the
author's works.... There are many situations in which copyright restrictions would inhibit
dissemination, with little or no benefit to the author. And the interests of authors must yield
to the public welfare where they conflict.") (citing to the Register's report on the general
revision of the U.S. Copyright Law of July 1961).
101Bruce W. Bugbee, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 21 (Public
Affairs Press 1967) (The Venetian system is generally regarded as the first true patent
system.). Giulio Mandich, Venetian Origins of Inventors' Rights, 42 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 378 (1960). See Bugbee, supra note 101, at 17. Bugbee credits a June 19, 1421
patent from the Republic of Florence to architect Filippo Brunselleschi as the world's
earliest true patent of invention. See Frank D. Prager, A History of IntellectualPropertyfrom
1545 to 1787, 26 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 711 (1944) (provides further discussion
regarding the early origins of patent law); Max Frumkin, The Early History of Patents of
Invention, 26 TRANSACTIONS OF THE NEWCOMEN SOC'Y. 47 (1947); Max Frumkin, The
Origins of Patents, 27 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 143 (1945) (The Venetian patent

system was based on the 1474 Venetian Act, which set forth many of the requirements found
in modem patent statutes.); Bugbee, supra note 101, at 20-25. In particular, the Act: (1)
provided exclusive rights for inventors to disclose their inventions to society; (2) required
that the invention be new to the Commonwealth (precursor to the "novelty" requirement);
(3) required that the invention be useful ("utility" requirement); (4) set a standard patent term
(ten years); and (5) provided for an infringement remedy. The 1474 Act also authorized
Government use of the invention without compensation. Bugbee, supra note 101, at 171 n.
64 (Bugbee points out that this government authorization did not compel the patentee to
assign his rights to the Government, but did require the patentee to extend to the government
a license.).
102 The 1624 Statute of Monopolies was not a true patent statute protecting inventor's
rights. Instead, it was a statute reaffirming previous English decisions banning royally
granted privileges and monopolies. The Statute also codified the court's recognition that not
all monopolies were evil and that some benefited the public. Clothworkers of Ipswich, 78
Eng. Rep. 147, 148 (K.B. 1615). There, the Court held:
If a man hath brought in a new invention and a new trade within the kingdom,.., or if a man
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the patent systems being developed in the various state colonies before U.S.
independence.
These systems were established to encourage the
introduction of new techniques and industries into the territories for the
benefit of the public.
Calls to develop a federal patent statute began immediately after the
United States independence from England. 0 3 Many of the framers had
experience with the state legislatures that had enacted copyright and patent
statutes.10 4 The framers thus were aware of the need to protect authors' and
inventors' rights, and of the need for a uniform federal statute. The framers
also were aware of the need to develop domestic manufacturers, rather than
rely on English and French trade.' 0 5 Perhaps most importantly, the framers
were aware of the evils of English monopolies. As to this, Thomas
Jefferson stated:

hath made a new discovery of any thing,... [the King] may grant by charter unto him, that
he only shall use such a trade or trafique for a certain time.... But when that patent is
expired, the King cannot make a new grant thereof, for when the trade is become common,
and others have been bound apprentices in the same trade, there is no reason that such should
be forbidden to use it.
103John M. DiJoseph, The One and the Many - The Expropriation of Intellectual

Property by the States: Copyright and the H1tA Amendment, 9 LoY. ENT. L. J. 1, 4-5 (1989)
(By 1787 state patent grants to inventors applying for protection for the same inventions in
several U.S. states made it apparent that a centralized federal system was needed to resolve
conflicting claims.). See also Bugbee, supra note 101, at 133 (noting that the state patent acts
heavily influenced the drafters of the first federal patent act, the Patent Act of 1790). But cf
Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, 43 IDEA
1, 33 (2003) [hereinafter Progressof Science] (challenging Bugbee's conclusion).
104 Bugbee, supra note 101, at 126-27. (One notable example was Charles Pinckney, who
served on the South Carolina legislature when it enacted the 1784 general copyright-patent
statute; he was also a member of the Constitutional Convention. Both Pinckney and Madison
submitted proposals to promote the progress of science and knowledge. Madison proposed to
give national legislature power to "encourage by premiums & provisions, the advancement
of useful knowledge and discoveries," and "to secure to literary authors their copy rights for
a limited time." Pinckney proposed to grant the national legislature the power to "grant
patents for useful inventions" and "to secure to Authors exclusive rights for a ... certain
time."); Both Bugbee and Walterscheid credit Pinckney as submitting the proposal that
ultimately led to the Intellectual Property clause. Bugbee, supra note 101, at 125-127;
Edward C. Walterscheid, Defining the Patent and Copyright Term: Term Limits and the
Intellectual Property Clause, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 315, 352 (2000) [hereinafter Defining the
Patent Term].
105In his address to the First Congress, President Washington remarked:
The advancement of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, by all proper means, will not,
I trust, need recommendation: But I cannot forbear intimating to you the expediency of
giving effectual encouragement, as well to the introduction of new and useful inventions
from abroad, as to the exertions of skill and genius in producing them at home ....
LAURENCE I. WOOD, PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAW 22 (1942).
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It seems pretty generally understood that this should go to
...
Monopolies .... [I]t is better ...to abolish . . . Monopolies, in all
cases, than not to do it in any. . . The saying there shall be no
monopolies lessens the incitements to ingenuity, which is spurred by the
hope of a monopoly for a limited time, as of 14 years; but the benefit
even of limited monopolies
is too doubtful to be opposed to that of their
'' 6
general suppression." 0
However, as with England and the colonies, this fear of monopolies
was tempered by the recognition that some limited monopolies were indeed
for the public good. In responding to Jefferson's concern, Madison stated:
With regard to Monopolies they are justly classed among the greatest
nusances [sic] in Government. But is it clear that as encouragements to
literary works and ingenious discoveries, they are not too valuable to be
wholly renounced? Would it not suffice to reserve in all cases a right to
the public to abolish the privilege at a price to be specified in the grant
of it? Is there not also infinitely less danger of this abuse in our
Governments than in most others? Monopolies are sacrifices of the
many to the few. Where the power is in the few it is natural for them to
sacrifice the many to their own partialities and corruptions. Where the
power, as with us, is in the many not the few, the danger can not be very
great that the few will be thus favored. It is much more0 7to be dreaded
that the few will be unnecessarily sacrificed to the many.'
It is against this backdrop that the framers expressly granted the
federal government the power to promote manufacturing and to advance
knowledge and science.
More specifically, the framers unanimously
gave Congress the power "to promote the progress of science and the useful
arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive

106

Progress of Science, supra note 103, at 5 (citing to Letter, from Jefferson to James

Madison (July 31, 1788)), in I THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS, THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON, 1776-1826, at 545 (James Morton Smith ed., W.

W. Norton & Co. 1995)).
107 Letter, from Madison to Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in I THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS,
supra note 106, at 566.
108 See generally Progressof Science, supra note 103, at 2-11. Little is actually known as
to how the intellectual property clause came to be included in the Constitution. What is
known is that it was adopted without dissent. Other than this, commentators contend that the
framers were involved in state legislatures and were trained lawyers and thus were aware of
the English patent grants, the individual state grants, and the need to encourage invention
and protect the rights of inventors. Id. at 13-14. Walterscheid suggests that the framers felt
the need to include the intellectual property clause in the Constitution because they "desired
to follow the English practice of granting exclusive rights through the issuance of patents or
something similar and were not at all certain that the Congress would have the power to do
so without an explicit grant of authority."
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right to their respective writings and discoveries." '10 9 This has become
known as the Intellectual Property Clause (also referred to as the Copyright

and Patent Clause).
One thing stands out about the Intellectual Property Clause: It declares

the primacy of the public interest.' 10 The Clause specifies that Congress
may pass statutes for one, and only one policy goal: "to promote the
progress of science and useful arts." Congress has advanced this goal in a
number of ways. For one, Congress enacted patent laws protecting the
public interest by giving the public access to the benefits of inventions."'
Also, while the inventor obtained a monopoly, Congress ensured that it was
short-lived. The laws limited the time inventors could exercise their rights,
2

thus getting the inventions into the public domain relatively quickly."
109 U.S. CONST.

art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

110 Progressof Science, supranote 103, at 13 n.43. Two additional things stand-out about

the Intellectual Property Clause. First, the clause is unique in that it is the only constitutional
grant of authority to Congress that specifically sets forth a means to exercise the granted
authority. The Clause directs Congress to promote the useful arts by securing to inventors
exclusive rights in their discoveries. The Clause is unusual not only because it is the only
clause that directs a precise method of promoting the public interest, but also because of the
specific method provided (securing exclusive rights), as there were a number of different
ways to promote the progress of useful arts. Among the methods that could have been used
to promote the progress of useful arts are medals, honorary titles, premiums, and bounties.
Id.at 13. One commentator suggests this was simply another example of the United States
following English practice. Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and Manufacturing in the
Early Republic, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 855, 875-76 (1998). Second, the
Clause limits grants to inventors for their discoveries. Unlike English and colonial practice,
which granted rights to inventors and to the first to introduce an invention into the realm,
this limitation significantly changed the definition of a new invention (i.e., novelty). It
effectively excluded from protection importation franchises. In a newly independent country
in desperate need of inventions and industry it may appear strange that Congress excluded
importation franchises. Walterscheid suggests that this demonstrates the primacy of private
interests over public interests. However, one could equally plausibly conclude that the
framers intended to limit the number of patents burdening society and intended to allow the
public access to inventions from abroad without the concomitant onus of a patent grant.
Along these lines, Richard Wells, arguing at that time against importation franchise patents,
cautioned that "America will be deprived of the advantage she now enjoys of imitating any
of the English inventions." Because "every person hath a right to examine the rolls in the
high court of Chancery & to demand copies of the patent specifications there filed," it would
have been "very unreasonable to grant 14 years exclusive benefit to the man who first
imports such copies." Id. (citing a Mar. 3, 1790 petition and letter from Wells to Rep. Henry
Wynkoop of Pennsylvania, which are in the House of Representative papers, National
Archives, HR lA-ER 1.1.).
I1Maskus, Economic Development, supra note 42, at 474 ("[lI]t is socially efficient to
provide wide access to new technologies and products, once they are developed, at marginal
production costs.").
112 Deron Burton, Bringing Theory into Practice: Predictable Scope for Functional
Patent Claims, 42 UCLA L. REv. 221, 227-28, n.33 (1994). The laws further ensured that
inventions already possessed by the public were not thereafter taken from the public domain
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The Supreme Court, the Constitutional framers, and leading scholars
have stressed the primacy of the public benefit. As early as 1829, the
Supreme Court stated:
While one great object was, by holding out a reasonable reward to
inventors, and giving them an exclusive right to their inventions for a
limited period, to stimulate the efforts of genius; the main object was to
promote the progress of science'and useful arts; and this could be done
best by giving the public at large a right to make, construct, use, and
vend the thing invented, at as earlX3 a period as possible; having a due
regard to the rights of the inventor.
Thereafter, the Court consistently and repeatedly justified the patent
laws based on their
benefit to society. For example, in Kendall v. Winsor,
14
the Court stated:
It is undeniably true that the limited and temporary monopoly granted to
inventors was never designed for their exclusive profit or advantage; the
benefit to the public or community at large was another and doubtless
the primary object in granting and securing that monopoly.... The true
policy and ends of the patent laws enacted under this Government are
disclosed in that article of the Constitution, the source of all these laws,
viz: 'to promote the progress of science and the useful arts,'
contemplating and necessarily implying their extension, and increasing
adaptation to the uses of society.
Again, in 1916, the Court stated:
Since Pennock v. Dialogue was decided in 1829, this court has
consistently held that the primary purpose of our patent laws is not the
and granted protection. Thus, the protection was only for truly new inventions. The patent
laws also elevated the public benefit by widely disseminating knowledge. Here, the
specification played a dominant role. The patent laws required inventors to disclose their
inventions, i.e., required a written description of the invention and the method for making it.
The public benefits from having access to the disclosure, which allows the public to improve
upon the invention. Professor Merges notes that the importance of the specification
requirement reflected a changed perception about what the inventor was contributing to
society. He states: "Under the original patent systems, society's benefit was the introduction
of a new art or technology into the country. By the late eighteenth century, the primary
benefit was seen as the technological know-how behind the inventor's patent." Merges
concludes that this was a "major change" in the economic role of patents as it emphasized
new and useful information instead of the introduction into commerce of finished products.
He goes on to state that the beneficiaries "were not just the public at large, but instead others
skilled in the technical arts who could learn something from the patentee's invention." In
either case, the public benefited.
113Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 9 (1829).
114Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 327-28 (1859).
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creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents, but is 'to promote
the progress of science and the useful arts. ..' This court has never
modified this statement of the relative importance of the public and
private interests involved in every grant of a patent, even while
declaring that in the construction of patents and the patent laws,
inventors shall be fairly, even liberally, treated. 115
This interpretation held throughout the mid-twentieth century. In 1932
the Court stated: "[t]he sole interest of the United States and the primary
object in conferring a monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors."'1 5 And in 1944, the Court succinctly
stated, "[i]t is the public interest which is dominant in the patent system."'
James Madison, one of the chief architects of the Intellectual Property
Clause, stated that "[t]he constitutional clause empowering Congress to
enact a copyright [and patent] statute reflects the belief that property rights,
properly limited, will serve the general public in an abounding national
culture."' 17 Similarly, Laurence Wood stated "[iut is fundamental that the
primary purpose behind the patent laws is for the benefit of the public rather
than of the individual inventor.' '1 8 Davies also stressed that "[t]he
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932); Progressof Science, supra note
103, at 46. Interestingly, Walterscheid describes the "modem view" of patent law as being
"directed to the public purposes of fostering technological progress, investment in research
and development, capital formation, entrepreneurship, innovation, national strength, and
international competitiveness," with no attempt to justify the patent system on the rationale
that it is intended to reward inventors. Walterscheid, supra note 104, at 393 (citing Hilton
Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995)) (Newman, Cir. J.
concurring). Walterscheid believes the early view of the patent system focused heavily on
rewarding patent owners. Edward C. Walterscheid, The Nature of the IntellectualProperty
115

Clause: A Study in the HistoricalPerspective (Part1), 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y

763, 780-81 (2001) (claiming that the public interest "would have been almost completely
foreign" and "totally alien" to the framers of the Intellectual Property Clause). Id at 781,
n.56. This considerably overstates the case. As support for this proposition, Walterscheid
relies almost exclusively on two things. The first is a comment from an 1831 circuit court
case, Whitney v. Emmett, 29 F. Cas. 1074, 1082 (Cir. Ct., E.D. Pa. 1831) ("[C]ongress [has]
declared the intention of the law to be to promote the progress of useful arts by the benefits
granted to inventors; not by those accruing to the public.") Walterscheid's other support is
the actions of the first commissioner of patents, William Thornton, who believed that the
patent laws were intended primarily to reward inventors. Walterscheid notes that because of
this, Thornton kept patents secret until they expired. As Walterscheid notes, however,
Thornton's efforts to amend the patent laws to keep patents secret were rebuffed by a
number of attorney generals, by President John Quincy Adams, by a number of prominent
attorneys, and, most importantly, by Congress. Moreover, the same justice that wrote the
opinion upon which Walterscheid relies, also two years earlier contradicted Thornton's
position. In short, and more to the point, the majority of commentators and judicial opinions
agree that the purpose of the patent laws was to benefit the public.
116 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inc. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944).
117 DAVIES, supra note 2, at 77.
118WOOD, supra note 105, at xiv.
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dominant idea in the minds of the framers of the Constitution appears to
have been the promotion of learning.... The
9 idea next in importance seems
to have been the protection for the author."
b. A Secondary Interest: Private Owners' Interest
While the "main and primary purpose of our patent laws is not the
creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents but 'to promote the
progress of science and useful arts,' ' 120 there must be some, indeed
significant, attention paid to private patent owners' interests. Without
offering adequate incentive to the patent owners to invent, there may be
fewer inventions and no public benefit. As Woods states:
it is necessary to remember that the key to the entire bargain is the
incentive which is offered [to] the patentee. To narrow his benefits is
correspondingly to lessen the incentive to invent. Consequently, any
resolution of conflict between the patentee's rights and the public
policy.,, must be achieved with the object of balancing the two public
interests against each other. 121
Not surprisingly, inventors have sought expansive rights. In fact, they
have argued that they have a natural right in their inventions, which right
the law should protect.1 22 This finds support neither in the literal language
of the Intellectual Property Clause nor in any of the European or colonial
precedents.1 23 Even the framers were wary of providing such rights. For
example, in arguing against
24 such rights, Jefferson cautioned against an
embarrassment to society.'
The Supreme Court also rejected a natural rights theory. In Wheaton
1 25
v. Peters,'
the Court held:
That congress, in passing the act of 1790, did not legislate in reference
to existing rights, appears clear, from the provision that the author, &c.
'shall have the sole right and liberty of printing,' &c. Now if this
exclusive right existed at common law, and congress were about to
DAVIES, supra note 2, at 78.
Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Peters 1 (1828); Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film Co.,
243 U.S. 502 (1917).
121 WOOD, supra note 105, at 21.
122 Walterseheid, supra note 104, at 346.
123France's 1791 Patent Act was based on the concept of patents as a natural right.
119
120

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON at 333-335 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1905)
124

("Considering the exclusive right to invention as given not of natural right, but for the
benefit of society, I know well the difficulty of drawing a line between things which are
worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not.").
125 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834).
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adopt legislative provisions for its protection, would they have used this
language? Could they have deemed it necessary to vest a right already
vested. Such a presumption is refuted by the words above
quoted, and
26
their force is not lessened by any other part of the act.
In so stating, the Court expressly relied on the lack of a natural right in
inventions.1 27 It stated:
The word secure, as used in the constitution, could not mean the
protection of an acknowledged legal right. It refers to inventors, as well
as authors, and it has never been pretended, by any one, either in this
country or in England, that an 12inventor
has a perpetual right, at common
8
law, to sell the thing invented.
The Court concluded that "Congress, then, by this
act, instead of
129
sanctioning an existing right, as contended for, created it.'
Although inventors do not have a perpetual common law right to their
inventions, the Intellectual Property Clause does secure to them exclusive
rights "for limited times." This limited monopoly presumably provides the
necessary incentive for inventors to create and to allow them to recoup
money spent in research and development. It also allows them to earn
profits on their inventions. Nevertheless, because the patent laws' primary
purpose is to benefit the public, in any conflict between private and public
interests, the private interest must be subordinated to the public interest. 3°
On this, the Supreme Court is clear:
The Copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a
secondary consideration... . The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the
126 Id. at 661. Modem courts also have rejected this view. See, e.g., Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) ("The patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the
inventor his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring
forth new knowledge.").
127 Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 657-58.
128 Id. at 661.
129 Id. at 661, 668. The Court added that "it may be proper to remark that the courts are
unanimously of the opinion, that no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written
opinions delivered by this court; and that the judges thereof cannot confer on any reporter
any such right."
130

See WOOD, supra note 105, at xiv. See also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,

307 (1980) ("The patent laws promote [the progress of science and useful arts] by offering
inventors exclusive rights for a limited period as an incentive for their inventiveness and
research efforts. The authority of Congress is exercised in the hope that '[the] productive
effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society through the introduction of new
products and processes of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of
increased employment and better lives for our citizens."').
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conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance public welfare through
the talents of authors
1
and inventors in "Science and Useful Arts.13
Accordingly, for our purposes, we must determine if TRIPS is truly
inconsistent with U.S. policy, and if so, we must subordinate those interests
to the U.S. public interest.
2. TRIPS: An Illusory Attempt to Balance Public and PrivateInterests?
As noted above, TRIPS requires many member countries to
dramatically strengthen and increase intellectual property protection and
enforcement. Despite these increased levels of protection and enforcement,
TRIPS purports to balance public and private interests. Whether TRIPS in
fact balances these two interests and, if so, whether that balance is "fair"
remains open to discussion. Certainly there are those who claim that TRIPS
is nothing more than "old-fashioned, Western-style imperialism," with an
emphasis on aiding developed countries and private rights at the expense of
developing countries and public interests. 132
Others claim TRIPS
appropriately protects intellectual property rights and benefits developing
and developed countries alike by promoting economic and technological
development. 133 To better evaluate whether TRIPS fairly balances public
and private interests or whether instead TRIPS falls squarely on the side of
either public or private interests, we here examine in more detail TRIPS'
objectives, purpose, and the same few critical "minimum standards" as
above, that is, the patent
term, patentable subject matter, and compulsory
34
licensing provisions. 1

131 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). The government
pursued broad social goals by encouraging individual creative economic energy. It is
oversimplified to think of law as promoting either simply the public interest or the private
interests. Nevertheless, while the patent system does pursue broad social goals through
encouraging private economic interests, various provisions within the patent system quite
clearly promote the public interest by limiting the unfettered or absolute right of private
parties.
132 See Hamilton, supra note 12; see Oddi, supra note 12; see Kohr, supra note 12.

e.g., Adelman & Baldia, supra note 18.
134 To be sure, whether TRIPS tilts in favor of private or public interests cannot be
133 See,

conclusively determined by disaggregating the various TRIPS' provisions and evaluating

them independently or in isolation. This ignores the political reality that provisions such as
these attempt to balance both private and public interests. Thus, while some provisions in
isolation will benefit private interests, other provisions, also in isolation, may benefit public
interests. Nonetheless, as argued here, whether considering TRIPS as a whole or various
provisions independently, TRIPS tilts heavily in favor of private interests.
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a. Objectives and Principles
As noted earlier, one of TRIPS' stated objectives is the "protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights," which TRIPS recognizes as
"private rights. 13 5 On the other hand, TRIPS seeks to promote the transfer
and dissemination of technology "to the mutual advantage of producers and
users of technological knowledge" and attempts to do so "in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare .... '9136
TRIPS' "Principles," Article 8, purport to balance the right holder's
private rights against the public need to prevent abuses, protect public
health and nutrition, and to promote sectors important to a country's socioeconomic and technological development. 137 Members may adopt measures
that promote the public interest and prevent abuse by intellectual property
rights holders, as long as such measures are consistent with the more
specific TRIPS provisions. 3 8 The benchmark with which such measures
must be consistent are those that establish TRIPS' minimum standards.
b. Minimum Standards
i. Patentablesubject matter
Ostensibly, through TRIPS's minimum standards, the private patent
owners' interests in being rewarded for their invention and the
encouragement of future inventions are balanced against the public's
interest in gaining the benefits from the inventions.' 39 For example, by
requiring member countries to provide patent protection in "all fields of
technology," Article 27's subject matter provision protects private interests
by preventing countries from excluding certain inventions. 40 These
135 TRIPS, supranote 19, art. 7, Preamble.
136 TRIPS, supra note 19, art. 7. TRIPS also provides:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to
the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
137 Id. art. 8.
138 Id.

139 World Trade Organization Fact Sheet on TRIPS, available at http://
www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tif e/agrm7_e.htm. In theory, TRIPS balances the
developing countries' need in having access to intellectual property and technology transfer
with the developed countries' need in reducing piracy and misappropriation. Id. See also
James Thuo Gathii, Construing Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy
Consistently with FacilitatingAccess to Affordable AIDS Drugs to Low-End Consumers, 53
FLA. L. REv. 727 (2000).
140 TRIPS, supranote 19, art. 27.

TRIPS Rebound
25:99 (2004)

exclusions were "profoundly controversial" with this being particularly true
with respect to the proposed exclusion of pharmaceuticals.1 41 The United
States firmly considered this provision preventing such exclusions as
"nonnegotiable." 4 2
The expanded definition of patentable subject matter also does away
with the distinction made by many countries-particularly developing
countries-regarding product patents and process patents. This distinction
is most visible with respect to pharmaceutical and chemical patents.
Previously, some countries issued patents on pharmaceutical and chemical
processes, but denied protection for pharmaceutical and chemical
products.43 By this distinction, local manufacturers could produce patented
pharmaceutical products as long as they did not use the same patented
process. This they can no longer do.
To balance such a broad grant, Article 27 provides limited exceptions.
Specifically, it provides that members may exclude inventions from patent
protection when necessary to protect "ordre public or morality" and may
exclude "diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of
humans and animals. 1 44 Members also may exclude plants and animals
other than 145
micro-organisms as long as members provide for sui generis
protection.
ii. Patent term
With respect to the patent term, generally speaking, a shorter patent
term promotes the public interest as it delivers earlier to the public domain a
patented product or process.1 46 A shorter patent term also benefits the
public because it guards against inordinately high prices for licenses,
141

Abbott, Cottier and Gurry note that patents were the most contentious subjects of the

Uruguay Round and solutions in the field of exclusions of patentability were of a
"profoundly controversial nature." FREDERICK ABBOTT, THoMAs COTTIER & FRANCIS
GURRY, THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM 694-95 (1999).
142

id.

India, for example, did not provide protection for products made by processes. See
Adelman & Baldia, supranote 18, at 524-25.
144 TRIPS, supra note 19, art. 27,
2-3.
145 Id. art. 27, 3(b).
146 This is an oversimplification and generalization. One might argue that a shorter term
143

does not promote the public interest or that a longer term promotes the public interest. These
arguments are based on the incentives provided to private parties. A longer term may benefit
the public because it provides more incentives to private parties. Similarly, a shorter term
may not provide sufficient incentives to private parties. Admittedly, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to predict the optimum term that provides the maximum level of incentive. This
again underscores the difficulty in distinguishing between the public good and private gains.
At some point, though, increasing the term will provide no additional incentive while
denying the public access to the invention. The question, of course, is when that point is
reached.
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encourages improvements to patented products, and results in lower prices
spurred by the competition that occurs when the invention or product is off
patent. 47 On the other hand, to provide incentives to private parties to
engage in beneficial activities, the patent term must take their interests into
account. These parties benefit from a longer duration as it allows them time
to recover the costs associated with bringing the invention to market and
allows them to earn profits for the risks taken. TRIPS Article 33's
minimum twenty year term is considerably longer than many countries
previously provided.
Additionally, countries are no longer able to
selectively determine appropriate or different terms for different products.
Here, private parties made significant gains.
iii. Parallelimportation
By allowing price shopping, TRIPS' parallel importation provision
benefits developing countries and consumers because they can obtain
lower-priced drugs. 4 8 Patent owners lose profits because their products
must compete with lower-priced imported alternatives. Patent owners and
developed countries also fear a backlash from consumers and countries
purchasing the products at higher prices.
The fear is that parallel
importation will expose the price disparities and cause higher paying
countries and consumers to demand the lower prices. 149 TRIPS allows each
country to determine its own policy regarding parallel importation.
iv. Compulsory licensing
The final minimum standard provision is that for compulsory
licensing. Compulsory licenses place limits on a patentee's rights. This is
usually justified on the basis of a benefit to the public. More specifically,
147See generally Walterscheid, supra note 104, at 330; see also Robert P. Merges &
Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839,
878-79 (1990).
148 For example in 1995, an identical amount of the antibiotic Amoxil, made by
SmithKline Beecham, cost $8 in Pakistan, $14 in Canada, $36 in the United States, $40 in
Indonesia and $60 in Germany. Bess-Carolina Dolmo, Examining Global Access to Essential
Pharmaceuticalsin the Face of Patent Protection Rights: The South African Example, 7
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 137 (2001). In addition, parallel imports benefit many European
Community countries where the government is the chief payer for health care services,
including pharmaceuticals. Parallel importation also might be viewed as a disadvantage for
lesser-developed countries. Specifically, parallel importation avoids the need for lesserdeveloped countries to develop local manufacturing capabilities. While a benefit in the short
term because it provides needed products, including drugs at reduced prices, parallel
importation hurts those countries attempting to develop such capabilities unless concurrent
strategies are used.
149 It is important to note that parallel imports are not imports of counterfeit products or
illegal copies. These are products made and marketed by the patent owner in one country and
imported into another country without the approval of the patent owner.
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compulsory licensing schemes attempt to balance the private interests of
rewarding the inventor with the public interest of having access to new
products. 5 Compulsory licensing allows consumers access to goods by
increasing the availability of the product in the country, while at the same
time increasing competition for the product, which often results in a sharp
decrease in price. These licenses also serve as incentives for patent owners
to license the product on fair and reasonable terms.' 5'
Opponents attack compulsory licensing proposals as efforts to
derogate or interfere with the exclusive rights afforded patentees. Such
interference, the argument goes, will reduce the incentives to invent,
impermissibly limit the patentee's ability to set prices, and eventually will
harm the public because less inventive activity will take place.' 5 2 TRIPS
150 GEORGE FOLK, PATENTS AND INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS

263 (1942).

'5' See Michael D. Scott, Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property in International
Transactions (1998), reprinted in D'Amato & Long, supra note 8, at 361. For developing
countries, compulsory licensing can also compel the transfer of technology. Id. According to
Gianna Julian-Arnold, the most prevalent compulsory licensing provisions are those
concerning blocked dependent patents, failure to work a patent, and patents related to foods
or medicines. Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales
and the Reality, 33 IDEA 349 (1993).
152 See Kirby W. Lee, Permitted Use Of PatentedInventions In The United States: Why
PrescriptionDrugs Do Not Merit Compulsory Licensing, 36 IND. L. REv. 175, 180 (2003).
These arguments notwithstanding, the patentee "benefits" by receiving reasonable
compensation for his invention, albeit less compensation than the inventor would receive
without compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing also is a less drastic alternative than
revoking the patent, which some countries authorize when a patentee fails to make the
invention available in that country. Indian patent law, for example, emphasizes the need for
an inventor to work their invention or suffer revocation of the patent. Adelman & Baldia,
supra note 18, at 524. The basic premise underlying compulsory licenses is that for one
reason or another a valuable invention is being withheld from or is unavailable to the public.
This can occur when: (1) the patentee suppresses or fails to work the invention in the
country; (2) there is an inadequate supply of the invention; or (3) the use of the patent results
in unreasonable, anti-competitive and monopolistic prices. To address these situations,
compulsory licensing schemes take two different forms: unrestrictedand restricted. At an
extreme, a government can grant unrestricted (blanket) compulsory licenses. These are
licenses granted to any manufacturer to produce a patented product without regard to the
availability or underlying circumstances. Under this type of scheme, anyone could obtain a
license upon paying a reasonable fee to the patent owner. This increases competition, assures
product availability, and provides competitive prices. Opponents attack this type of scheme
as harming small businesses and individuals because larger competitors can obtain licenses
and sell products at a price that undercuts the smaller businesses. See, e.g., FOLK, supra note
151, at 266. The larger competitor would be able to do so because they would not have
expended any money on research and development to bring the product to market. Smaller
companies would, however, receive royalties for the licenses, which may offset their
projected losses. Moreover, small companies also would have access to larger companies'
technology and products through licensing and would be able to also "benefit" from not
having research and development expenditures for those products. The small companies thus
would be able to offset their purported disadvantages. Opponents further argue that because
a licensee could step in and essentially share the profits of the person who invested
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provides for compulsory licensing. However, as noted above, it contains
numerous conditions that members must satisfy before granting such
licenses.
v. Limitationsand exceptions
As an attempted balance to TRIPS' expansive minimum substantive
rights, Article 30 states that members may provide exceptions to the rights
TRIPS confers on patentees. The exceptions, however: (1) must be
"limited"; (2) cannot "unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of
the patent"; and (3) must not "unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the patent owner."'153 This tripartite test must be met before any
member can limit a patentee's rights.
These various patent provisions are only a part of the entire TRIPS
Agreement.
TRIPS includes additional patent provisions, copyright
provisions, and trademark and trade secret provisions, among others.
Moreover, the TRIPS Agreement is part of the overall WTO package,
which contains numerous additional agreements covering not only
intellectual property but also goods and services.
Nevertheless, it is contended here that, on the whole, these TRIPS
provisions bear out that TRIPS is more a private rights regime. First,
TRIPS, while only one of many WTO agreements, purports to balance
public and private interests. Second, the above provisions arguably have
had the greatest impact and most far-reaching consequences. The greatly
considerable time, effort, and money into commercializing the product, many businesses
would be unwilling to perform the necessary research and development, and many investors
would be reluctant to invest in these enterprises. Id. A reasonable royalty can take into
account the costs of research and development. Also, the answer to this is not to do away
with all compulsory licensing schemes, but to avoid blanket or general compulsory licensing
schemes. See, e.g., Neal Seegert, Compulsory Licensing by JudicialAction: A Remedy for
Misuse of Patents,47 MICH. L. REV. 613, 638 (1949) (citing Coburn, Compulsory Licensing
by the Courts, 28 PAT. OFF. SOC'Y. 180 (1946)); see also Sylvester Petro, Patents: Judicial
Developments and Legislative Proposals, 12 CHI. L. REV. 80, 409 (1942); EDITH T. PENROSE,
THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 173 (1951) (arguing that
compulsory licensing may retard technological development because it may reduce the
"greater inventiveness" of the United States, which is due to the "almost unconditional"
monopoly the patent system provides). Penrose lists six arguments advanced against
compulsory licensing: (1) it is an unacceptable violation of property rights; (2) it reduces
incentives to invent; (3) it harms large research and development firms that depend on
patents; (4) it hurts small companies that must license to large companies; (5) it does not
provide a mechanism for determining a "reasonable royalty;" and (6) it does not reduce
restrictions on industry. Id.at 172.
In contrast to the blanket schemes, more common are restricted compulsory licensing
schemes. These schemes tie the grant of compulsory licenses to specific abuses. In addition
to those named above (unavailability, suppression and nonuse), compulsory licenses are
granted when a patent owner misuses the patent, or when the national interest mandates it.
153TRIPS, supra note 19, art. 30.

TRIPS Rebound
25:99 (2004)

expanded subject matter protection and the illegality of excluding certain
inventions from protection unquestionably benefits private interests. The
lengthened term, and its application to all products regardless of field,
benefits private interests. While TRIPS is facially neutral with respect to
parallel importation, arguably, its effect is to benefit private interests as
developed countries with large lucrative markets such as the United States
can - and do - restrict patented products from reentering the country under
national exhaustion principles . 4 Because TRIPS Article 31 permits
compulsory licensing, arguably, it favors the public interest. However, the
carved-out exceptions and numerous mandatory conditions have caused
considerable harm to developing countries and the public and threaten to
continue to do so unless addressed and/or amended. The push for fewer
restrictions on intellectual property rights, including efforts to completely
eliminate compulsory licensing, will further harm countries, including the
United States. In short, while the provisions and the objectives seek to
achieve the proper balance between the private and public interests, the

balancing is more myth than reality; in practice, the balancing tips clearly in
favor private interests. 155
c. TRIPS Was Designed To Remedy Piracy And Misappropriation
The origins of TRIPS also serve as indicia of TRIPS' focus on private
interests. The leading motivation behind the move to increase international

intellectual property protection was the developed countries' push to protect
their interests in the face of globalization and the increased economic
importance of intellectual property. 156 In the United States, the world's
leading intellectual property exporter, the increased economic importance
has proven dramatic. In less than four decades the percentage value of U.S.
154 See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
The legal principle behind parallel importation is exhaustion. Once a patented product is sold
or placed on the market by the patent owner (or with their consent), the seller no longer has
control over the sale (or export) of that particular product, their rights are "exhausted" by the
first sale of the product. Under national exhaustion, a patent right is exhausted only with
respect to the country where the product was placed on the market. This does not exhaust
patent rights in another country. Thus, for example, if a firm sold a product in India, the
firm's rights would be exhausted in India, (i.e. the buyer could sell the product in India), but
not in Kenya. Internationalexhaustion means that the patent right is exhausted anywhere in
the world when placed on the market anywhere in the world. The sale of a product in India
would allow the sale of that product in Kenya, without infringing the patent. Regional
exhaustion, which exists in the European Union, means that exhaustion is relegated to a
number of specific countries or region, generally broader than the national market.
155Others also have argued that TRIPS severely distorts the traditional balance between
private and public interests. This is a result of its "single-minded protectionist goal." See,
e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement: Introduction to a
Scholarly Debate, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNT'L L. 363, 385 (1996).
156See, e.g., Demiray, supra note 22.
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intellectual property exports produced 5tripled,
from 9.9% in 1949 to 27.4%
7

in 1986, and is still rapidly increasing.
The United States contended it was disadvantaged in the competitive
global marketplace because of widespread intellectual property "piracy"
occurring in the developing countries. 5 8
In particular, because each

157 In short, the United States was concerned that worldwide piracy drastically
affected
and jeopardized its dominance and competitiveness in manufacturing. By demanding
protection, the United States could secure the competitive edge of U.S. intellectual property
exports.

Given this trend, the new locus of the United States' competitiveness now largely depends on
its capability not only to generate research, software designs, entertainment, engineering
concepts, advertising, marketing, styling, legal and financial innovations and informationbased inventions, but also to protect these forms of intellectual property as rights. Such
protection would in turn secure the competitive edge of United States intellectual property
exports.

James Thuo Gathii, Construing Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy
Consistent with FacilitatingAccess to Affordable AIDS Drugs to Low-End Consumers, 53
FLA. L. REv. 727, 753-54 (2000). The United States' concern is somewhat belied by the
United States' own position that worldwide piracy is not the sole reason for it losing its
global competitiveness. Other factors include managerial and manufacturing failures
resulting in low productivity, and high labor costs. FRIEDRICH-KARL BEIER, GATT OR
WIPO? NEW WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 131

(1996).

158 Legislative comments provide insight on U.S. sentiment concerning piracy.
Representative Dingell remarked before the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee:

[A]II the companies and workers of this country ask is a level playing field. Yet, with a few
exceptions, this Administration continues to turn the other cheek when country after country
targets industry after industry .... First, the intellectual property of our industry is stolen.
Then our foreign markets are flooded with counterfeits.... Finally, our firms are driven out
of business, or close to it - and, all the while, their markets are insulated from meaningful

competition.
32 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 609, 799 (1986).

Similarly, Senator Wilson remarked:
In the area of intellectual property protection, plainly stated, criminals around the world are

costing American companies billions of dollars by cranking out millions of unauthorized
copies of U.S. records and tapes, movies, books, toys, computer programs, as well as by
expropriating patents and process patents, developed at great expense by U.S. companies, to
make bootleg pharmaceuticals and chemicals. What makes this illegal activity all the more
outrageous is that it is often protected by governments we consider friendly to the United
States. Indeed, in many cases we have provided special trade benefits in order to help them
develop their economies.

132 CONG. REc. S5752 (daily ed. May 12, 1986).
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country has its own patent laws, again, these countries excluded from
protection certain inventions.
Notably absent from protection were
pharmaceutical and agricultural inventions, that countries excluded in an
effort to maintain public health
and adequate food security through
159
affordable medicines and foods.
The United States contended that the refusal to protect intellectual
property had trade-distorting effects.
Specifically, it argued that
international trade was in peril because unfair advantages could be created
by disregarding intellectual property laws.' 60 By reducing piracy, the
United States and other intellectual property-exporting countries would
receive stolen rents from developing countries for the use of patented
technology. While the amount of lost rents is difficult to accurately
calculate, the United States International Trade Commission (USITC)
estimated that in 1984 alone the United States lost 6 to 8 billion dollars in
annual sales from the "stolen" use of patented technology. 6' The USITC
estimated that in 1986 the United States lost 23.8 billion dollars.' 62 A more
recent article estimates that the United States loses from $43 to $63 billion
annually from intellectual property infringement. 63 The problem was
particularly acute in the pharmaceutical area.' 64 The United States'
pharmaceutical industry charged that it, more than any other industry, was
159For example, Brazil refused to give patent protection to pharmaceuticals on the

ground that its low-income population would be unable to afford pharmaceuticals protected
by patent laws. Frank Emmert, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round- Negotiating
Strategies of the Industrialized Countries, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1317, 1327 (1990). Another
example is Thailand, which excluded pharmaceutical, agricultural, and biological products
from patent protection out of concern for the price increases that would result from paying
royalties on patented technology in such critical areas. Stefan Kirchanski, Protection of U.S.
PatentRights in Developing Countries: US. Efforts to Enforce PharmaceuticalPatents in
Thailand, 16 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 569, 572 (1994).
160It is estimated that piracy accounts for 5% of the world trade. SODIPO, PIRACY, supra
note 2, at 9.
161David I. Wilson, A Trade Policy Goal for the 1990s: Improving the Adequacy and
Effectiveness of Intellectual Property Protection in Foreign Countries, I TRANSNAT'L LAW
421, 422 (1988), in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Anthony D'Amato &

Doris Estelle Long eds., 1997).
162Id. It should be noted that these figures are based on self-reporting within industries.
These numbers are necessarily speculative. That is not to say there are no losses; to be sure
there are. However, the extent of the loss may be exaggerated to further support
strengthening of intellectual property laws. For a critical analysis of the report upon which
much of this is based see Paul J. Heald, Misreading a Canonical Work: An Analysis of
Mansfield's Canonical1994 Study, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 309 (2003).
163Patricia Montalvo, Comments: How Will the New Twenty-Year Patent Term Affect
You? A Look at the TRIPS Agreement and the Adoption of a Twenty-Year Patent Term, 12
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 139, 140 (1996).

164John A. Harrelson, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIVIAIDS Crisis:
Finding the Proper Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, 7
WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 175, 184 (2001).
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65
harmed by this piracy.'

d. The Pharmaceutical Industry Influence
The U.S. pharmaceutical industry argued that patent protection was the
cornerstone of its industry. 166 Because it costs millions of dollars to
successfully develop and bring new drugs to market, 167 the industry
explained that without worldwide patent protection it would not be able to:
(1) recover its large research costs; (2) earn profits; (3) lure investors to
invest in valuable research and commercialization;' 6 and (4) invest in
future research and development. 69 In the late 1970s, the industry devised
a strategy to improve intellectual property protection internationally "until
American standards became the international norm, especially in
developing countries."' 170
Intellectual property's increased economic
importance, the advances in technology, the globalization of the economy,
and piracy precipitated the United States' push for TRIPS and for specific
provisions that: (1) protected all inventions, including pharmaceutical
products and processes; (2) limited the ability of states to use compulsory
licensing to override pharmaceutical patents; and (3) extended the term of
protection for pharmaceuticals.' 71 The pharmaceutical industry got much of
165

See Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS: The PharmaceuticalIndustry Drive to

Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives
Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1069 (1996).
166 See CIPR Report, supra note 17, at 29. See also Paul Durman, Pay What You CanThe New AIDS Medicine, TIMES NEWSPAPER LTD., Apr. 22, 2001.
167 A recent study states that it costs $802 million to bring one new medicine to market.
Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of Innovation: New
Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166 (2003). These numbers
are not free from doubt. Moreover, despite these enormous costs, the drug industry is the
most profitable industry in the country. Id.
168 Murray J. Elston, Improving Access to Medicines in Developing Countries, CNN
DISCLOSURE (Mar. 8, 2001).
169 This fails to take into account the enormous part played by publicly funded research.
See DiMasi, supra note 168, at 151 (noting that five of the top selling drugs were developed
with critical help from the National Institute of Health, the leading publicly funded research
organization).
170 MICHAEL RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 68 (1998).

171It is not unusual that an industry can influence international governance; international
governance, just as national governance, is subject to pressures on the decision makers by
societal forces such as multinational corporations, NGOs and other non-state actors.
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 47, at 19. Nevertheless, we must recognize this
and consider carefully whether we have gone too far in protecting the narrow economic
interests. We should worry whether "emergences of large single-cause machines and
politically powerful NGOs diminish significance and power of sovereign states." Id. at 34.
In more pointed terms, we should be wary of having these narrow interests dictate our
national interests. Nonetheless, this begs the question: How was the industry able to
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what it sought.
TRIPS' background, stimulus, and provisions thus reflect this focus on
private interest-a focus that is at odds with the United States' historical
public interest focus.
C. Harms from Overprotecting Intellectual Property
The rebound effect, i.e., the United States' loss of sovereignty and the
inconsistent focus of TRIPS and U.S. intellectual property law, might be
acceptable but for the harms caused by overprotecting intellectual property,
as TRIPS does. Simply put, overprotection does not benefit the public.
Scholars and commentators have questioned whether increasing
intellectual property rights will benefit the public. 172 At first glance,
increased protection can lead to increased incentive and thus to a public
benefit. But, as these academics note, overprotecting intellectual property

is as dangerous-if not more dangerous-as underprotecting it.

For

example, in discussing the harms caused by broadening intellectual
property protection for software inventions and business methods, Professor
Lessig states: "While it is clear that patents spur innovation in many
important fields, it is also173
clear that for some fields of innovation, patents
do more harm than good."
Lessig identifies a number of harms caused by increased patent
protection, including the "hold-up" problem and the "anticommons"
problem.1 74 The "hold-up" problem occurs when an innovator who is about
accomplish on the international level what it could not on the domestic level? There are
several factors that may explain this. Although international governance (and national
governance) can be viewed as being shaped by internal pressures from competing
stakeholders, in some instances, such as here, the non-existence of a competing stakeholder
tips any decision and benefit decidedly in favor of the remaining stakeholders. The same
domestic constituent forces that actively opposed the pharmaceutical industry domestically
were simply not present during the initial negotiating strategy for increased intellectual
property protection. Moreover, the WTO process is vastly different from the previous WIPO
process, where the industry's efforts were much less successful. The private sector plays a
significant role during WIPO negotiations, as NGOs are permitted to not only observe but
participate in meetings and formal negotiating sessions. Dinwoodie, INTERNATIONAL IP,
supra note 60, at 58. The WTO process is less transparent and less open; the private sector is
excluded from meetings and negotiating sessions. Id. Finally, different transnational
industries (e.g., software, database, chemical and pharmaceutical industries) with common
goals and interests (increased intellectual property protection) combined to help pass
legislation at the international level that individually each of these industries may not have
been able to accomplish at the domestic level. See, e.g., Gathii, supra note 158 (discussing
the Intellectual Property Committee, a coalition of twelve American-based transnational
corporations formed to promote increased protection for intellectual property rights though
trade regimes).
172 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 2; Oddi, supra note 12; Hamilton, supra note 12.
173 Lessig, supra note 2, at 209.
174

Id. at 214.
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to release a product discovers that it violates a patent. The innovator then
must decide whether to withhold the product from the market, or pay
royalties that may be artificially inflated and could have possibly been
avoided, for example, by "designing around the patent," if she previously
were aware of the patent.17 The "anticommons" problem involves the
underuse of a resource. Several inventors may block the use of the resource
through blocking patents, (i.e., "multiple and overlapping patent
protection"), resulting in significant underuse, even if the patented material
was indispensable to an invention. 76 In that case, inventors are deterred
from entering a field of development, "because too 177
many people have the

right to veto the use of a particular resource or idea."'
American jurists have expressed similar concerns about overprotecting
intellectual property. In his dissent in White v. Samsung Electronics
America, Inc.,' 7 Judge Kozinski wrote:
[R]educing too much to private property can be bad medicine....
Public parks, utility rights-of-way and sewers reduce the amount of land
in private hands, but vastly enhance the value of the property that
remains.
So too it is with intellectual property. Overprotecting intellectual
property is as harmful as underprotecting it. Creativity is impossible
without a rich public domain. Nothing today, likely nothing since we
tamed fire, is genuinely new: Culture, like science and technology,
grows by accretion, each new creator building on the works of those
who came before. Overprotection
stifles the very creative forces it's
79
supposed to nurture.'
80
More recently, in Eldred,1
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer
voiced these concerns in the copyright area. In a scathing dissent, Justice
Breyer argued that the Copyright Term Extension Act's ("CTEA")
increased copyright protection unconstitutionally harmed the public. He
argued that the CTEA's economic effect made the copyright term unlimited,
and its practical effect inhibited, not promoted, the progress of science.18'
Specifically, Justice Breyer found that the Act imposed "higher than
necessary" royalties, caused "substantial harm to efforts to preserve and to

175

id.

176 Id. at 214-15. Lessig also opines that the potential abuse "makes it irrational for an
innovator to develop a particular idea." Id. at 215.
177 Id.

178 White v. Samsung Electronics Am. Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
179 Id.

at 1513.

180 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
181Eldred, 123 S.Ct. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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disseminate works that were created long ago," restricted "traditional
dissemination of copyrighted works," and would "likely inhibit new forms
of dissemination through the use of new technology." 182 He thus concluded
that the CTEA was unconstitutional as violating the Intellectual Property
Clause because it did not fulfill the183Clause's true purpose of promoting the
progress of science and useful arts.
Justice Stevens also dissented in Eldred. He too argued that ex post
facto extension of the copyright term frustrated the Copyright Clause's
purpose 184and instead transferred wealth from the public to copyright
holders.
Justice Breyer's, Justice Stevens', Judge Kozinski's, and Professor
Lessig's comments evidence a growing concern that more protections for
private intellectual property are not necessarily better. 185 Instead, increased
protection through expanded subject matter definition, increased patent
term, and limited use of compulsory licensing, inter alia, will result in
products being withheld from the public for longer periods, will result in
artificially inflated prices, will severely limit the public domain of technical
information, and will inhibit the progress of science.
As should be obvious, these concerns apply with equal force to TRIPS
and implementing legislation. 86 TRIPS involves exactly the kind of
overprotection that hurts the public. By constraining Congress' ability to
address and correct for this shortcoming, TRIPS will inevitably bring harm

1"2 Id. at 266.
183 Id. at 247 ("For present purposes, then, we should take the following as well

established: that copyright statutes must serve public, not private, ends; that they must seek
'to promote the Progress' of knowledge and learning; and that they must do so both by
creating incentives for authors to produce and by removing the related restrictions on
dissemination after expiration of a copyright's 'limited time .. "). See also Holland
Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue, 277 U.S. 245, 257 (1928) (if patent law too strongly favors
private interests and creates further incentives to innovate, it discourages add-on inventions
because "the patent monopoly would thus be extended beyond the discovery and would
discourage rather than promote invention").
184 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 225 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185 See also CIPR, supra note 17, at 4:
[M]ore intellectual property rights may lead paradoxically to fewer useful products for
improving human health. Companies may now incur considerable costs, in time and money,
determining how to do research without infringing other companies' patent rights, or
defending their own patent rights against other companies. This gives rise to a question as to
whether the substantial costs involved in patent searching, analysis and litigation are a
necessary price to pay for the incentives offered by the patent system, or whether ways can
be found to reduce them.

186 Indeed, Justice Breyer's and Stevens' criticisms were against an act that was passed,
in part, to comply with the United States' international copyright obligations.
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the U.S. public.' 8 7 To make this argument more concrete, we use as
examples the U.S. compulsory licensing and patent term provisions. In
these areas, consistent with promoting the public interest, Congress and the
courts have limited the term of protection and have, provided for
compulsory licensing, both general and specific provisions, to address
public needs.
IV. COMPULSORY LICENSING REBOUND
A. To Promote the Public Interest
1. In the NationalInterest
As noted, compulsory licensing limits the patentee's exclusive rights.
It is "the standard form of remedial action" curbing the patentee's almost
boundless rights.' 88 Compulsory licenses balance the public interest in
having access to goods at affordable prices against the private owners'
interests in setting prices and enjoying monopoly privileges. To guard
against patentees suppressing, making unavailable, aid not using
inventions, and to ensure that the public is not harmed by a patentee's
misuse or abuse of his patent, countries, including the United States, issue
compulsory licenses. 189 In the United States, compulsory licensing has
been used to address situations that benefit the public through a number of
specific compulsory licensing statutes, and a general compulsory licensing
statute authorizing government use of patented products. Compulsory
licensing also is used as a remedy for patent misuse and antitrust violations.
187 There are contrary arguments. For example, Perlmutter argues that we need not decide
whether each provision in a treaty or statute promotes progress. As she explains, "As a
practical matter, it would be virtually impossible for the United States to play a leadership
role [in international copyright policy) if each individual element in each negotiation had to
independently promote the progress of science in order to make the implementing legislation

constitutional." Sheila Perlmutter, Participationin the International Copyright System as a

Means to Promote the Progressof Science and Useful Arts, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 323, 332
(2002). Perlmutter intimates that a statute that does not promote the progress may
nevertheless pass muster if it is justified by harmonization with international obligations and
standards. However, as Professor Solum correctly notes, "this argument suggests that an
unconstitutional [copyright statute] might be resurrected via treaty." Lawrence B. Solum,
Congress 's Power to Promotethe Progressof Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 LoY. L.A. L.
REv. 1, 69 (2002). It cannot. See supra Part II.A. In any event, it is not clear that TRIPS
implementing legislation on a whole (let alone each individual element) promotes the
progress
of science.
88
1 Dinwoodie, supra note 60, at 427.
189 Almost every country has some form of a general compulsory licensing scheme.
Generally, compulsory licensing schemes address patent nonuse and suppression. It has been
argued that there is no evidence of this in the United States; thus, there is no need for
compulsory licensing, at least to address these situations. FOLK, supra note 151, at 262.
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Compulsory licensing in the United States was initially tied to efforts
to address national concerns. More specifically, these efforts began at the
state level to encourage compulsory working of patents.1 90 Because a
purpose of the patent laws is to encourage development by introducing new
industries and new and useful inventions,19 1 many have argued that implied
in the patent grant is an agreement to "work the patent."'
In other words,
a patentee must manufacture the patented invention domestically to ensure
that the public has access to a sufficient number of inventions. This
prevents the suppression of patents or deliberate non-use of patents, which
deprives the public of new inventions. 93 When the owner fails to work the
patent, the government issues compulsory licenses so that others can
produce the invention, thus ensuring the invention's availability. States
such as South Carolina passed compulsory working and licensing
provisions as early as 1784. 194
While the federal government did not follow the states' lead regarding
compulsory licensing for failure to work, it did provide for compulsory
licensing in other areas where it was necessary to protect the public
interest. I95 One such instance was the national defense. Compulsory
190 Pennsylvania's patent statute included a clause requiring the inventor to commence
working the invention within the state within eight months. Edward C. Walterscheid, The
Early Evolution of the U.S. Patent Law: Antecedents, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
665, 669 (1996) (citing Pennsylvania Statutes at Large).
191PENROSE, supra note 153, at 34.

192 It is more accurate to say work the invention rather than the patent, as the idea is to
introduce the invention into society. However, because the common phrase is to work the
patent, that phrase is used here.
193 FOLK, supra note 151, at 261. The patent system, through this mechanism, also
develops natural resources, increases the supply of technicians and skilled labor, and
increases the number and variety of domestic manufacturing concerns. PENROSE, supra note
153, at 137.
194 The 1784 South Carolina copyright/patent statute compulsory licensing provision is
an early example. The statute, "An Act for the Encouragement of Arts & Sciences,"
provided for state intervention if the patent owner did not work the invention or charged
exorbitant prices. BUGBEE, supra note 101, at 94; FLOYD L. VAUGHAN, ECONOMICS OF OUR

PATENT SYSTEM 17 (1925). The state could intervene and grant a license to a complainant,
who also had this obligation. Id.
195 In the federal context, efforts to introduce compulsory licensing began with the first
patent act, the 1790 Act. After the House introduced and passed H.R. Bill 41 (the first patent
bill), the Senate proposed amending it. The Senate added a compulsory licensing provision
modeled after various state statutes. BUGBEE, supra note 101, at 143-44; see also PENROSE,
supra note 153, at 166 n.9; WALTERSCHEID, supra note 110, at 139. This is generally
regarded as "the first reference to compulsory licensing appearing in literature of the history
of patents." PENROSE, supra note 153, at 51; VAUGHAN, supra note 195, at 17. The provision

authorized compulsory licenses when the patentee failed to offer for sale "a sufficient
number" of the invention in the country or sold the invention "beyond what may be judged
an adequate compensation." PENROSE, supra note 153, at 165-66. The House rejected the
Senate's proposed amendment. Thereafter, and after extended discussion, Congress passed
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licensing in this area dates back to at least WWI. 19 6 Immediately prior to
WWI, Congress believed that patents on critical military supplies could
cripple America's wartime efforts. It thus enacted the Act of June 25,
1910,197 which permitted the federal government to authorize any company
to manufacture a product despite an existing patent so long as it was needed
to protect the welfare of the country. 98 The import of the statute was that
the government was a compulsory, nonexclusive licensee and could grant to
any manufacturer compulsory licenses. The United States has used this

provision extensively.
the 1790 Act without the compulsory licensing provision. BUGBEE, supra note 101, at 144.
Although rejected, the 1790 proposed amendment was typical of later compulsory licensing
proposals in that it sought to prevent the suppression or non-use of inventions. In these
schemes, if the patentee did not work the patent and introduce the invention into public use,
the patent could be revoked. These schemes were being used in other countries, most
notably, France, England, and Germany. PENROSE, supra note 153, at 177-87. The call for
compulsory licensing diminished with the later increased role of the written description
requirement. Patentees used the written description requirement to clearly distinguish their
invention from all other things before known, and to provide an enabling disclosure to one
skilled in the art. Id. at 138 (compulsory working requirements were all but abandoned when
"replaced" with the written description requirement). It is ironic that the United States was
the first country to propose compulsory licensing but is the only major country that did not
incorporate into its patent laws a compulsory licensing provision.
196 Act of 1910, c.243 Stat. 851, amended at 40 Stat. 704, 705 (1918) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1498).
197

id.

198Id.

See Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 341 (1928).
See also M. SILVERMAN AND P. LEE, PILLS, PROFITS AND POLITICS 158 (1974). In full, the
statute provided:
That whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United States shall
hereafter be used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of the owner
thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, such owner's remedy shall be by suit
against the United States in the Court of Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire
compensation for such use and manufacture.
28 U.S.C. § 1498.
The purpose of the amendment was to relieve the contractor entirely from liability of every
kind for the infringement of patents in manufacturing anything for the Government and to
limit the owner of the patent and his assigns and all claiming through or under him to suit
against the United States in the Court of Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire
compensation for such use and manufacture. The word 'entire' emphasizes the exclusive and
comprehensive character of the remedy provided.

Richmond Screw, 275 U.S. at 343.
199 Potter, supra note 91. One early example was in 1917, when the development of the
United States aircraft industry was seriously retarded by a chaotic situation regarding
aeronautical patents. In particular, two competing companies, the Wright Brothers and the
Curtiss Company, were threatening all other airplane and seaplane manufacturers with patent

TRIPS Rebound
25:99 (2004)

2. PatentMisuse and Antitrust Remedies
Compulsory licensing has also been used in the United States to
protect the public against patent misuse and abuse. Such conduct occurred
during the high point in patentee's rights. The industrial revolution and the
changing face of the United States' economy combined to afford patentees
new uses for their patents. These uses, while technically within an owner's
rights, had deleterious social effects. For example, uses included forming
cartels, 20 0

patent pools,

20 1

and monopolies. 20

arrangements to exploit the patent system.

Inventors

used these

More precisely, these

arrangements allowed corporations to dominate an industry and to
manipulate and fix prices within that industry.20 3
To address this, in 1890 Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act.2 4
The general thrust of the Act was to promote competition in a free
market. 20 5 The Sherman Act sought to achieve competition by making

infringement suits. These manufacturers refused to manufacture planes because they feared
lawsuits. The government was able to use the Act to secure favorable royalty rates.
Manufacturers Aircraft Ass'n v. United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 481 (1922); see also Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (suit for reasonable and entire
compensation for the unauthorized manufacture of use by the United States of patent
claiming synchronous communications satellite). More recent examples where the
government has used § 1498 to obtain a license on patented inventions include Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566 (1996) and Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 113
F.3d 1572 (1997).
200 Cartels are described as monopolies or restraint of trade on an international basis.
VAUGHAN, supra note 195, at 136. These arrangements involve the use of patent pools,
licensing, or the use of patents to control the market among nations.
201 Vaughan describes a patent pool as "an arrangement by which two or more patent
owners put their patents together and receive in return a license to use them." VAUGHAN,
supra note 195, at 39. Each member of the pool then has exclusive use to the others' patents,
usually without paying a royalty. After pooling or cross-licensing their patents, members
then divide the market. Id. at 138. Vaughan credits the sewing machine patents in 1856 as
the first patent pool among manufacturers. Id. at 40. He gives an excellent account of the
history of patent pools and other anti-competitive arrangements.
202 Monopolies, also referred to as patent consolidations, involve the "outright and single
ownership by a manufacturer of all patent rights pertaining to a particular industry."
VAUGHAN, supra note 195, at 69.
203 Corporations accomplished this using patents; two or more patent owners would put

their patents together and receive in return a license to use them. Id. at 39. Manufacturers
would also consolidate patents to obtain the outright and single ownership of all patent rights
pertaining to a particular industry. Id. at 69. Industry domination and other anticompetitive
practices were widespread. Indeed, they occurred in the glass container, aluminum,
incandescent lamp, telephone, oil production, steel and wire, shoe machinery, and farm
machinery industries, to name a few. PETRO, supra note 153, at 371; see generally
VAUGHAN, supra note 195.
204 Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (1964) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2001)).
205 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND
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illegal all arrangements or agreements that restrained trade or commerce.
The Clayton Act,2 °6 which followed, prohibited acts that "substantially

lessen[ed] competition or tend[ed] to create a monopoly."
conduct that fell outside the ambit of the Sherman Act. 20

It dealt with
7

Because the

antitrust acts prohibited monopolies, and patent laws created monopolies,
there was considerable confusion as to where one law began and where the
other ended. The dilemma was this: could patentees exercise their patent
rights even if in doing so they violated the Antitrust Acts?

Initially, the Supreme Court allowed such conduct to continue, holding
20
that these arrangements were acceptable uses of patentees' rights.
However, as such abuse aid anticompetitive behavior became rampant-a
direct result of "almost absolute" patent rights2 09-the
Supreme Court
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION

708 (1975).

206 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
207 LADAS, supra note 206, at 708.
208 At least for the early part of the 20 th Century, the Supreme Court viewed patent pools

and similar arrangements as a patentee's acceptable use of their patent rights. The Court's
1902 opinion in the NationalHarrow case is illustrative:
The very object of these [patent] laws is monopoly, and the rule, with few exceptions is, that
any conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with regard to this kind of property,
imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for the right to manufacture or use or
sell the article, will be upheld by the Courts. The fact that the condition is in the contracts
keep up the monopoly or fix prices does not render this illegal.
Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902). The Court was no less protective of
patentee's rights when dealing with suppression and nonuse. The Court found that, just as
anti-competitive behavior was an acceptable use of a patentee's exclusive rights, so too was
the deliberate withholding from the public of inventions. This despite the fact that
suppression was recognized as "one of the greatest evils of the patent system." Walther E.
Wyss and Richard R. Brainard, Compulsory Licensing of Patents,6 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 499
(1939). Again illustrative is the Court's holding in Patent Continental Paper Bag Co. v.
Easter PaperBag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908). There, the Court held that a patent imposes
no duty on the patentee to use his invention or permit others to use it and, thus, the patentee
has the right to withhold the benefits of his invention from the public--even if for the full
term of his patent monopoly. The PaperBag case left open, however, whether, if the public
interest was directly at stake, a court could withhold injunctive relief for patent infringement.
Id. at 430 ("Whether, however, a case cannot arise where, regarding the situation of the
parties in view of the public interest, a court of equity might be justified in withholding relief
by injunction, we do not decide."). Although the Court left undecided this question, one
could argue that the deliberate withholding of the patent is itself always against the public
interest. The Court's unwillingness to peel back the scope of patentee's rights led two
commentators of that time to suggest that "desires to limit or abolish patent nonuse or
suppression must come from the legislature." Wyss & Brainard, supra, at 499. This did not
happen. Instead, Congress exhibited the same reluctance to interfere with patentee's rights.
See, e.g., FOLK, supra note 151, at 259-61.
209 According to Petro, patents made these particular abusive practices "a practical
necessity." PETRO, supra note 153, at 371. In many of these instances, competitors owned
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reacted by issuing a number of opinions attacking monopolies.2 1 °
The Court held that various practices made possible by patent
arrangements impermissibly restrained trade. 21 Notably, these practices
were similar to conduct the Court previously viewed as legitimate uses of
patent rights. But to the post-Sherman Act Court, such practices threatened
competition, discouraged improvements, improperly maintained high
prices, and, most importantly, violated the Sherman Antitrust Act (or were
considered patent misuse).
The shift in the Supreme Court's view of monopolies, patent rights,
and the purposes of the patent laws was captured by Justice Douglas in
Special Equipment v. Coe:
It is a mistake.., to conceive of a patent as but another form of private
property. The patent is a privilege "conditioned by a public purpose."
The public purpose is "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts." The exclusive right of the inventor is but the means to that end.
[...] But the Paper Bag case marked a radical departure from that
patents on the same or closely related aspects of a product. This required that competitors
either risk expensive and uncertain litigation or cooperate in some fashion. Patent pooling,
cross-licensing, or cartels were the result. See also VAUGHAN, supra note 195, at 138.
(Vaughan remarks that the chief reason for the major growth in monopolies was "a definite
program to exploit the patent system in order to accomplish certain economic and political
objectives."). Vaughan also states that the dominant objective of cartels is to control the
market, which provides "economic gains and, in some instances, political power in peace
and military strength in war." Id. at 140.
210 See, e.g., Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); Hartford-Empire
Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S.
131 (1948); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); United States v.
U.S. Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76 (1950).
211 See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
212 VAUGHAN, supra note 129, at 40, 62. Initially, the Supreme Court merely denied relief
to a complaining patentee on the ground that the patentee misused the patent (i.e., the
patentee impermissibly broadened the physical or temporal scope of the patent grant with
anticompetitive effect). Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppinger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 489 (1942)
(patent misuse recognized as an equitable defense to patent infringement). Many of these
cases involved "tying" contracts, where the patent owner tied the sale of unpatented products
to the sale of a patented product. Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27
(1931), reh'g granted, 283 U.S. 420 (1931); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppinger Co., 314
U.S. 488 (1942).
In Hartford-Empire, 323 U.S. 386, 436-37 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting in part), Justice
Black remarked: "The history of this country has perhaps never witnessed a more completely
successful economic tyranny over any field of industry than that accomplished by these
appellants." Justice Black identified patents as "the major weapons in the campaign to
subjugate the industry." Id. at 437. As a remedy for this misuse, the lower court ordered that
Hartford-Empire license its products to anyone who requested a license on a royalty-free
basis. The Supreme Court upheld the compulsory licensing decree; however, it held that
Hartford-Empire was entitled to a reasonable royalty on its licenses. Hartford-Empire Co. et
al. v. United States, 324 U.S. 570, 573.
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theory. It treats the "exclusive" right of the inventor as something akin
to an "absolute" right. It subordinated
the public purpose of the grant to
21 4
the self-interest of the patentee.

Similarly, in United States v. Line Material Co.,213 the Court remarked:
The effort through the years has been to expand the narrow monopoly of
the patent. The Court, however, has generally been faithful to the
standards of the Constitution, has recognized that the public interest
comes first and reward to the inventors second, and has refused to let the
self-interest of the patentees come into the ascendancy.

During this time, courts increasingly ordered compulsory licenses in
cases as remedies for patent misuse and antitrust violations. 1 4
3. Specific Compulsory Licensing Schemes
Other United States' statutes for compulsory licensing include the
Atomic Energy Act, 215 the Clean Air Act, 2 16 and the Bayh-Dole Act. 2 17 The
Atomic Energy Act permits any person at any time to apply to the
government for a license to use a patented invention or discovery useful 2in
18
the production or utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy.
(1948) (Douglas, J., concurring).
The court identified the following types of patent misuse: illegal tying contracts; sham

213 333 U.S. 287, 316
214

litigation (used to interfere with competitor's business relationships); and fraud in the Patent
and Trademark Office (Walker Process claims). In re Independent Service Organizations
Antitrust Litigation, 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000); See also Zenith Radio v. Hazeltine
Research, 395 U.S. 100 (1969), on remand,418 F.2d 21 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. granted, 397
U.S. 979 (1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 321 (1971), reh'g denied,401 U.S. 1015 (1971) (holding as
misuse the licensing of products on the basis of the percentage of licensee's total sales,
without regard to the actual use of the licensor's patent); Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v.
Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.,. 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965). From the view of advancing
the public interest, the 1970s and 1980s began a negative shift in focus in the compulsory
licensing arena as changes resulted in the dismantling of the patent misuse doctrine and
antitrust law. Professor Merges attributes this to the founding of the Federal Circuit (1982)
and the academic "law and economics" revolution. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW
AND POLICY 865 (2d. ed. 1992) [hereinafter MERGES, PATENT LAW]. See also Windsurfing

Int'l v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Recent economic analysis
questions the rationale behind holding any licensing practice per se anti-competitive.");
Senza-Gel Corp., v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 665 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Commentators and
courts have questioned the rationale appearing in Supreme Court opinions dealing with
misuse inview of recent economic theory and Supreme Court decisions in non-misuse
contexts.").
215 42 U.S.C. § 2183(g) (1970).
216 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2003) (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-6 (1970)).
27 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000).
21810 C.F.R. § 780.41 (2004). The applicant must file
a petition containing a statement
that the applicant "cannot otherwise obtain a license from the owner of the patent on terms
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The Nuclear Regulatory Commission may grant a nonexclusive license to
use the invention if it finds that such use "is of primary importance to the
conduct of the activit[y]" by a person authorized under the section and'21the
9
Commission declares the patent to be "affected with the public interest.
Under the Clean Air Act, 220 whenever the Attorney General determines
that a right under a U.S. patent is necessary to enable a person required to
comply with the statute to so comply, the Attorney General may so certify
to a U.S. district court, which may issue an order requiring the patent owner
to license the patent on "reasonable terms and conditions." The Attorney
General must determine that the patent is being used or intended to be used
for public or commercial use and "not otherwise reasonably available," that
there are "no reasonably alternative methods to accomplish" the purpose,
and that "the unavailability of such right may result in a substantial

lessening of competition or tendency to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce in any section of the country. 22 '
Finally, the Bayh-Dole Act 222 establishes a federal policy regarding the
patenting and licensing of federally funded inventions. The Act allows
nonprofit and small businesses that enter into a funding agreement with the
federal government for experimental, developmental, and research work to
elect to retain patent rights.223 The Act also retains for the federal funding
agency certain residual rights in subject inventions, such as a non-exclusive,
irrevocable license to practice the inventions throughout the world. The
federal government thus retains the right to use any patented research tool
arising in the course of federally-sponsored research without liability for
patent infringement.224
which are reasonable for the applicant's intended use of the patent." Id. The applicant must
include the steps taken to obtain a license, and the effects denial will have on the applicant's
activities. The applicant also must include proposed terms the applicant believes are
reasonable. Id.
219 Id.
220

42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2003).

221 id.
222

35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212. The Act seeks to promote technology transfer and economic

development by encouraging universities to patent inventions made with federal support, and
to license those inventions to private industry. Id. at § 200.
223 By a Presidential Memorandum, the same policy has been extended to federally
funded research and development contracts with other types of contractors. Memorandum on
Government Patent Policy, 1 PuB. PAPERS 248 (Feb. 18, 1983).
224 In practice, however, this license has been of little practical value to NIH in obtaining
research tools from its grantees, either for its own intramural scientists or for dissemination
to others. Some grantees have taken the position that the statute provides protection from
infringement only, and have refused to provide samples of the materials in question to
facilitate the actual use.... The Bayh-Dole Act also has a mandatory licensing provision
commonly referred to as the "march-in" authority at 35 U.S.C. § 203(1). "The purpose of the
march-in authority is to prevent the underutilization of federally funded inventions. Like the
government-use license, march-in would apply only to those research tools that could be
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B. Post-TRIPS Developments
1. TRIPS-Plus' ProposedComplete Ban on Compulsory Licensing
Despite the fact that over ninety-six countries (or 71% of the countries
worldwide) have some form of compulsory licensing, proponents of
increased intellectual property protection have pointed out that these
countries have rarely invoked them. 225 This being the case, they seek in
TRIPS-plus a complete ban on compulsory licensing.226
An appropriate response to this argument has two components.
Firstly, while it is true that compulsory licensing has not been used as
extensively as it could be, it nonetheless remains an important restraint on
abuses by patentees, as shown above. Second, as recent experiences in both
Brazil and the United States demonstrate, the mere existence of compulsory
licensing schemes and the threat of a compulsory license can lead the patent
owner to license products on commercially reasonable terms and obviate
the need to issue a license in practice.2 27 Further, as Abbott and Cottier note
there are many possible explanations for the lack of use (particularly by
shortfalls which produce an
developing countries), including infrastructural
228
inability to take advantage of the license.
defined as patentable "subject inventions." Prior to exercising march-in rights, the agency
must determine that such action is necessary because of the failure of the contractor or its
licensees to take effective steps to achieve practical application of the inventions in a
particular field of use, to satisfy health or safety needs, or to meet requirements for public
use specified by Federal regulations.
Nat'l Inst. of Heath, Report of the National Institute of Health Working Group on
Research Tools, App. D (1998), http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/appendd.htm (last
visited Aug. 3, 2003).

225 Carlos Correa, The GATT Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights: New Standards for Patent Protection, 16 E.I.P.R. 327, 330-33 (1994).
Abbott, supra note 142, at 717.

226 See Klug, supra note 41, at 9.

227 Jerome H. Reichran and Catherine Hasenzahl, Non-voluntary Licensing or Patent
Inventions: HistoricalPerspective,Legal Framework Under TRIPS, and an Overview of the
Practice in Canada and the United States of America, UNCTAD/ICTSD (Sept. 2002),

available at http://www.iprsonline.org. See also Jennifer L. Rich, Roche Reaches Accord on
Drug with Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2001 ("Brazil also obtained significant price
discounts from Merck in March of 2001 after threatening to impose a compulsory license.");
Miriam Jordan, Merck Vows AIDS Helpfor Brazilians, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2001.
228Abbott, supra note 142, at 717-18. Also, patent disclosures oft times do not provide

sufficient detail and background information to enable a person skilled in the art to work the
invention. The CIPR similarly noted the following as reasons for the lack of use: (1)
developing countries' fears that sanctions may be threatened; (2) the fact that developing
countries may have no manufacturers with the know-how to reverse engineer and
manufacture the drug; and (3) the fact that these manufacturers may not see a sufficiently
large market to justify the costs of investment and manufacture. CIPR Report, supra note 17,
at 42.
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2. Anthrax Episode
Second, and more importantly for our purposes, there are possible
deleterious effects in the United States from a TRIPS-plus proposal. Two
recent developments bear this out. The first development concerns the
anthrax episode. Immediately after the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks, the United States was concerned that terrorists would use anthrax
against it in biological warfare. 229 The United States sought to obtain a
large supply of Cipro, the antibiotic used to treat anthrax. A German
company, Bayer, owned the patent on Cipro. When the United States grew
concerned that required quantities of the drug would be unavailable, it
threatened to override Bayer's patent and have generic manufacturers
produce the drug under compulsory licenses. The United States claimed its
actions were not driven by Cipro's price, but instead was about the
"national interest." Not surprisingly, as a result of the United States'
actions, it was able to "persuade" Bayer to sell the drug to it at half Bayer's
original asking price.230
In defending its action against charges of threatening Bayer, the United
States, through the Department of Health and Human Services, stated:
The United States may procure items without first obtaining a license,
so long as it pays "reasonable and entire compensation." There was no
need for the Secretary to exercise this power. The Secretary was able to
negotiate an historic agreement with Bayer that ensured an
unprecedented production of Cipro. When negotiations with Bayer
were pending, the Secretary did make clear that if he needed authority to
produce generics, he would ask Congress. Offering to work with
Congress on a matter of such importance is hardly the same as
"threatening" a company. The Secretary acted properly and with

229

On September 11, 2001, terrorists attacked the United States by flying airplanes into

the World Trade Center buildings, killing over 2,700 people. At about the same time, other
terrorist organizations also threatened to use, and in small instances did use, biological
warfare against the United States. The United States sought to prepare for increased, largescale attacks by ensuring that it had an ample supply of antibiotics for all of its citizens.
230 The United States government, through the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
publicly demanded that rather than charge its original price, Bayer charge the same amount
generic manufacturers charged. John Carey & Amy Barrett, Drug Prices: What's Fair?Bus.
Wk. (Dec. 10, 2001), at 60. Bayer agreed to sell the drug to the United States at almost half
its original asking price. Id.This conduct belies the United States' statement that ignoring
Bayer's patent was not about the price. It also belies the United States' concern that Bayer
may not have been able to provide enough of the drug. Moreover, although the United States
contends it is usually against interfering with patents, Christopher Shays, chairman of the
House Government Reform subcommittee, said that Congress would probably back any
request to bypass the Bayer patent. Keith Bradsher & Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Says Bayer
Will Cut Cost of Its Anthrax Drug, N.Y. Times (Oct. 24, 2001), at B7.
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23
deliberation in the matter of Bayer's Cipro patent. 1

The duplicity in this statement is glaring. The United States' stance
with respect to the Doha Declaration and developing countries' ability to
use TRIPS' compulsory licensing provisions to address the tragic AIDS
pandemic is indistinguishable from the anthrax incident.232 Further, the
anthrax incident emphasizes the importance of compulsory licensing
provisions in protecting and advancing the public interest here in the United
States. TRIPS-plus may undermine this.
3. Prescriptionand Generic DrugProposals
The second development is the renewed and ferocious debate
regarding prescription and generic drugs and American efforts at both the
state and federal level to "rein in drug companies. 23 3 For example, in
1994, H.R. 4151, entitled the "Essential Pharmaceuticals Act of 1994,"
provided for making pharmaceutical patents subject to compulsory licenses.
This would occur when the Department of Health and Human Services
determined: (1) that a patent holder "has not taken all the reasonable steps
toward the commercial marketing" of the patented drug; and (2) that the
"availability of the product to the public is of vital importance to the public
health or welfare."2 4 In 1999, H.R. 2927, entitled "Affordable Prescription
Drugs Act," was introduced. This provided for compulsory licensing of
certain patented medical inventions.
In 2001, two proposals, H.R. 1708
("Affordable Prescriptions Drug and Medical Inventions Act") 23 6 and H.R.
3235 ("Public Health Emergency Medicines Act") 237 were introduced, both
providing for compulsory licensing under certain circumstances. 238 These
231CIPR Report, supra note 17, n.69.
232 Brazil is another example of a country that was able to successfully use the threat of
compulsory licensing to obtain drastically reduced prices on AIDS drugs.
233 See Melody Petersen, Vermont to Require Drug Makers to Disclose Payments to
Doctors,N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2002 at C1.
234 Essential Pharmaceuticals Act of 1994, H.R. 4151, 103d Cong. (1994).
235 Affordable Prescription Drugs Act, H.R. 2927, 106th Cong. (1999).
236 Affordable Prescription Drugs and Medical Inventions Act, H.R. 1708, 107th Cong.
(2001). H.R. 1708 was designed to correct unjustifiably high prices that both inflate health
care spending and limit access to prescription drugs. It also required drug companies to
publicly disclose the financial information necessary to evaluate the prices charges for
patented drugs.
237 Public Health Emergency Medicines Act, H.R. 3235, 107th Cong. (2001).
238 Recently, Congress also introduced bills concerning pharmaceutical companies'
"skyrocketing" advertising and marketing costs, which contribute to exorbitant drug prices.
Senate Bill Would Limit Drug Ad Tax Deductions, REUTERS, May 7, 2002. Savings from the
bill would help pay for Medicare. Id. One proposal would have limited pharmaceutical
companies' tax deductions for advertising to that amount spent on research and
development. Id. In another effort to curb high drug prices, Vermont became the first state
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are but a few examples, both past and present, documenting the need for

compulsory licensing

and demonstrating

that the debate regarding

239

compulsory licensing is far from dead.
TRIPS Article 31 may constrain national governments, including the
United States, in their ability to rely on compulsory licensing. While the
United States still may subject patents to compulsory licensing for the
public interest, for example, by basing such use on TRIPS Article 8
"principles," the licenses must satisfy the detailed set of conditions and
limitations under Article 3 1.240 These conditions are more stringent than
in the nation to require pharmaceutical companies to disclose cash payments and gifts to
doctors, hospitals, and health care facilities. Such gifts (e.g., theater tickets, sporting events,
free dinners, flights to Florida for vacations) influence doctors to prescribe expensive drugs
rather than similar less expensive ones. Petersen, supra note 236. Hawaii signed a law that
requires drug companies to report the amount of money spent on marketing. Petersen, supra
note 236, at Cl. By limiting promotion costs, these bills sought to reduce drug costs.
Reducing drug costs could then alleviate the need for compulsory licensing or be used in
connection with other efforts such as compulsory licensing to reduce costs overall. PhRMA
contends that this "single[s] out one industry and attempt[s] to penalize it for these legitimate
business interests."
239 The pharmaceutical industry has legitimate concerns about protecting its interest and
providing appropriate incentives for innovation and has spent massive amounts of money
successfully lobbying against these bills. However, it may overstate its case. For years the
pharmaceutical industry has argued any laws passed weakening patent protection (such as
through compulsory licensing) or affecting companies' ability to reap profits would slow the
introduction of new drugs, work to the detriment of Americans' health, and cripple research
efforts. After each projected demise, however, the pharmaceutical companies survived and
continued earning unrivaled profits. As one pharmaceutical company attorney said over three
decades ago-after the 1973 Supreme Court decisions Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott and
Dunning, Inc., Weinberger v. Bentex Pharm., Inc., Ciba Corp. v. Weinberger, and USV
Pharm. Corp. v. Weinberger, which required adequate and well-controlled clinical evidence
to demonstrate a drug's safety and efficacy:
The trouble with that line of chatter is that the industry has been using it too long, and we've
lost our credibility. For nearly seventy years, the industry has bucked almost every proposed
new drug law by warning that it would wreck the industry, make us cut down on research,
destroy American medicine, ruin the public health, and probably bring on communism. The
problem now is that there are too many people-especially in the Congress-who won't
swallow it. They know only too well that, with all the new laws, drug industry profits are
higher than ever. Drug research has been expanded. American medicine has never been more
productive. And the health of the public has never been better. For too many years, the drug
industry has been crying 'wolf.' Now, we're convincing each other-but nobody else. The
new Supreme Court decisions? Our people can live with them.
133-34 (1974) (citing
Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott and Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973); Weinberger v.
Bentex Pharm., Inc., 412 U.S. 645 (1973); Ciba Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 640 (1973);
USV Pharm. Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 655 (1973)).
240 As a matter of political strategy, the United States is unlikely to make such an
argument, as it would open the door for other countries to follow suit, thus undermining the
MILTON SILVERMAN & PHILLIP LEE, PILLS, PROFITS AND POLITICS
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those examined under U.S. law by, among other things, requiring prior
negotiation with the patent owner, using the patent predominantly for the
supply of the domestic market, and making the legal validity of any
decision relating to the authorization of license use subject to judicial
24
review.
TRIPS-plus,
and the effort
completely
licensing ' thus
should be troubling
to thetoU.S.
public. eliminate compulsory
V. PATENT TERM REBOUND
A. Promoting the Public Interest
As with compulsory licensing, limiting the term an owner enjoys a
monopoly is a necessary limit on the owners' rights for the public's benefit.
The proper length of the patent term has been the subject of much debate
throughout the history of the United States' patent regime.242 Congress,
United States' current position and jeopardizing the gains made by the pharmaceutical
industry.
241 See TRIPS, supra note 19, art. 31(b), (f), (i). Cries that compulsory licensing will ruin
the industry and significantly impact United States' technological advantage also may
overstate the case. While there is a slight chance that compulsory licensing may reduce the
incentive to innovate, this risk is justified to assure the public has complete access to
products for which the patent is granted and to assure "more complete utilization and
commercialization of innovative products." Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory PatentLicensing
in the United States: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 8 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 666, 669
(1998). Moreover, not all recent economic analysis suggests that compulsory licensing is
bad. In responding to arguments that compulsory licensing retards technological progress,
Scherer states that a "substantial amount of evidence now available suggests that compulsory
patent licensing ...would have little or no adverse impact on the rate of technological

progress...

."
PERFORMANCE

F.M.

SCHERER,
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AND

ECONOMIC

457 (2d ed. 1980). Scherer confines instances for compulsory licenses to
cases in which patent-based monopoly power has been abused. Id. As such, arguments that
compulsory licensing actually serves to hinder the public interest indeed may amount to
posturing. Instead, as United States history demonstrates, in specific circumstances, such
licensing furthers the public interest and is a necessary limit on patentees' rights.
242 Again, in general, a short patent term promotes the public interest as it delivers
inventions earlier to the public domain, guards against long monopolistic prices for licenses,
and encourages improvements, among other things. Early advocates for short terms included
Benjamin Franklin, who believed that inventions should be quickly placed into society to
continuously serve others. He eschewed a term of years for his "Franklin stove," stating:
"That as we enjoy great Advantages from the Inventions of others, we should be glad of an
Opportunity to serve others by any Invention of ours, and this we should do freely and
generously." BUGBEE, supra note 101, at 72. Bugbee notes, however, that Franklin, unlike
most inventors, was a man of "independent wealth," which may explain his seemingly
altruistic views. Id.
The patent term recognizes private interests by allowing these interests sufficient time to
commercialize their inventions, recover costs, and reap profits. Patentees have long argued
that patent terms were insufficient. Walterscheid, Defining the Patent, supra note 104, at
370. Walterscheid states that the New England Association believed the 14-year term was
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however, has rejected requests to increase the term and has instead kept the
term relatively short. For example, in the first U.S. Patent Act, the 1790
Act, Congress defined the "limited times" requirement of the Intellectual
Property Clause by setting the initial patent term "not to exceed fourteen
years. '' 43 Despite repeated requests to extend the term, Congress hewed to
this definition, keeping it at fourteen years for the next eighty years.24 4
too short, and that the Massachusetts Association argued for a 14-year renewal term for
patents. EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS:
AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 1787-1836 308-12 (1998). Brazenly, some
sought rights in perpetuity. An early inventor and staunch supporter of patent owner's rights,
Oliver Evans expressed this view often. Id. at 310. This concept is based on a natural rights
theory of patent law, i.e., that inventors have a natural right in their inventions and that the
law, rather than create rights, needed simply to protect these existing natural rights. The
natural rights theory played a very minimal role in the evolution of the patent system. But
See, Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents:An Intellectual History, 15501800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255 (2001). Backing away from perpetual grants, others sought a
slightly less ambitious term of "life of the invention." WALTERSCHEID, supra, at 3 10. Neither
the Intellectual Property Clause ("for limited times") nor the purpose of the patent laws ("to
promote the sciences and useful arts") justified inventors' cries for these terms. Congress
properly rejected such requests.
243 The time had to be limited to that sufficient "to promote the progress of science and
useful arts." Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 11 (1829) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 8). This language "contemplates ... that this exclusive right shall exist but for a limited
period, and that the period shall be subject to the discretion of [C]ongress." Id. In the first
U.S. Patent Act, the 1790 Act, Congress set the term "not to exceed fourteen years."
WALTERSCHEID, supra note 245. It is not contended here that this was the time sufficient to
promote the progress of the useful arts. Rather, Congress merely copied the English term,
without considering the appropriate term for the states. Walterscheid, Defining the Patent
Term, supra note 104, at 363. Jefferson's comment here is instructive:
Certainly an inventor ought to be allowed a right to the benefit of his invention for some
certain time. It is equally certain it ought not be perpetual; for to embarrass society with
monopolies for every utensil existing, & in all the details of life, would be more injurious to
them than had the supposed inventors never existed: because the natural understanding of its
members would have suggested the same things or others as good. How long the term should
be is the difficult question. Our legislators have copied the English estimate of the term;
perhaps without sufficiently considering how much longer, in a country so much more
sparsely settled, it takes for an invention to become known & used to an extent profitable to
the inventor,

Id. at 370 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Oliver Evans (May 2, 1807), reprinted
in GREVILLE BATHE & DOROTHY BATHE, OLIVER EVANS: A CHRONICLE OF EARLY AMERICAN

ENGINEERING 127 (1935) (emphasis added).
244That the term remained so should not suggest it was without controversy. On the
contrary, in the area of patent term extensions the debate was fierce. Patentees argued that
Congress should extend terms if patentees did not fully exploit their inventions within the
initial 14-year term. Oliver Evans was the first inventor to petition Congress for an extension
of his invention concerning the improvements in the milling of flour. Id. note 104, at 368.
Congress did not act on it. Extending a patent beyond its original term would harm society
by keeping from it new and useful inventions. Thus, despite repeated and numerous requests
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When Congress did increase the term in 1861, it did so as an apparent
compromise between providing term extensions and increasing the initial
patent term. 45 As to an extension, however, it was expressly limited to
patents issued before March 2, 1861 and was based "solely in its effect on
the public interests. 246 The patent term remained seventeen years for the
next one hundred-thirty years. 47 This was essentially the status before
from inventors, Congress severely restricted the number and circumstances for granting
extensions in order to serve the public interest. It was not until 1832 that Congress passed
any legislation providing for term extensions. Id. at 369. From 1790 to 1836 Congress
extended patent terms in only seven cases. These extensions were passed by special acts of
Congress, rather than under a general patent statute providing for extensions. According to
Walterscheid, Congress "exhibited no interest whatever in either statutorily extending the
term of the patent grant or providing for a statutory right of renewal" and "exhibited
considerable caution in granting term extensions." Id.at 374.
245 Walterscheid suggests that the seventeen-year term was Congress' perception that this
term was "sufficient to remove the need for any administrative extension process."
Walterscheid, Defining the Patent Term, supra note 104, at 379.
246 Id. note 148, at 378 (quoting SUBCOMM. ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 96TH CONG., THE
HISTORY OF PRIVATE PATENT LEGISLATION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 9 (Comm.

Print 1979)). This was the result of Congress "questioning its earlier assumption that a
primary role of the patent system was to reward inventors as opposed to promoting the
public interest." Id. at 379.
247 In 1984, as a result of a ferocious debate about the skyrocketing costs of prescription
drugs and the need to support more extensive research and development for drugs, Congress
passed The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (the Act is
also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act or Bolar Amendment). Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 § 101 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(1) (1984)). As the
name implies, the Act combined two proposals. The "drug price competition" component
provided for an abbreviated application procedure to approve new drugs, allowing
manufacturers to market generic drugs shortly after a patent expired. The DrugPatent Term:
Longtime Battlegroundin the Controlof Health Care Costs, 24 NEw ENG. L. REV. 115, 138
(1989) [hereinafter The Drug Patent Term]. The "patent term restoration" component
amended patent law by providing the requested drug patent extension. The Act provided for
a five-year extension for drug patents for regulatory delays such as the time spent complying
with FDA pre-market testing requirements. 1d. (citing Drug Act, 98 Stat. 1585, 1598
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 156(a) (1984)).
This happens because drug
manufacturers file patent applications before their drugs enter the clinical testing stage,
which takes typically from eight to nine years. The Drug Patent Term, supra note 250 at
119-121. The Act allows drug manufacturers to extend their patent term by the sum of two
periods of time: the time taken by the final FDA review and half the time spent in clinical
testing after the patent is granted. The manufacturers argued that these delays shortened a
patent's "effective life," and owners were entitled to that lost time. Patent owners and drug
manufacturers were allowed the "lost" time, but extensions were capped at five years. 35
U.S.C. § 156 (1994). It is highly unlikely that both a regulatory delay extension and an
issuance delay extension are granted; thus, a patent term extending more than twenty-five
years is "most unusual." Walterscheid, Defining the Patent Term, supra note 104, at 380.
Drug manufacturers have been able to extend their patents even further. As part of the Act,
generics were provided a streamlined process so that they could enter the market as soon as
the drug patents expired. However, if the drug manufacturer seeks additional patents on a
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TRIPS.
B. Post TRIPS Developments
1. 20-year term

When the United States became a WTO/TRIPS signatory the patent
term changed. TRIPS required the United States to enact legislation to
bring domestic laws into conformity with its provisions; one of the changes
was to extend the patent term to twenty years from the filing date.24 8 In the
hearings regarding TRIPS implementation, the most controversial and
contentious testimony focused on this change.2 49 Yet, TRIPS-and its focus
on private rights-was able to accomplish indirectly what others could not
do directly, increase the term to 20 years.250
While the change in the term itself may not be of major significance,
there is no evidence that Congress considered whether the changes would
25
meet the constitutional mandate of promoting the progress of useful arts. '
particular drug (usually several years before the drug is set to expire), they gain an automatic
thirty-month injunction against any generic competition by claiming the new patent is being
infringed. The new patent can be on unapproved indications for the drug, specific drug
formulations, or even tablet shape. Id.
248 All other patent terms previously discussed ran from the issuance date rather than the
filing date.
249 In short, some argue that the change in the patent term could seriously diminish the
patent protection for inventions that had long pendency periods, as the new term begins on
filing the patent application, rather than upon issuance of the patent. Ironically, these include
biotech and pharmacological inventions.
250 Since at least 1898 there have been efforts to change the patent term to twenty years
from the filing date. Neal Seegert, Compulsory Licensing by JudicialAction: A Remedy for
Misuse of Patents, 47 MICH. L. REv., 611, 620 (1949) (citing NAT'L PATENT PLANNING
COMM'N, FIRST REPORT 18-19 (1943)). See also, FOLK, supra note 151, at 298-99 (stating
that in 1898 Commissioner Duel proposed a 20-year term, and noting that the T.N.E.C. in its
final report recommended a 20-year term from the filing date). All of these proposals were
properly rejected because, among other reasons, they did not promote the public interest.
251 Congress did consider the advantages and disadvantages of U.S. inventors andcompanies in relation to foreign inventors and companies, but did not adequately consider
the advantages and disadvantages vis-d-vis the U.S. public and inventors. Congressional
debate reveals that both the House of Representatives and Senate were concerned with two
major issues: the effective length of the patent term and submarine patents. See 140 Cong.
Rec. E2263 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994); see also 140 Cong. Rec. Hl 1455 (daily ed. Nov. 29,
1994) (statement of Rep. Ballenger); 140 Cong. Rec. Hl1508 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 1994)
(statement of Rep. Swift); 140 Cong. Rec. HI 1472 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 1994) (statement of
Rep. Horn); 140 Cong. Rec. E1538 (daily ed. July 22, 1994) (statement of Rep Rohrbacher);
140 Cong. Rec. E1526 (daily ed. July 22, 1994) (statement of Rep. Bentely). Congress'
primary debate on these issues revolved around whether changing the patent term would
have adverse or beneficial effects on U.S. businesses. See 140 Cong. Rec. H 11455 (daily ed.
Nov. 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Ballenger) (stating that by changing the patent term to
twenty years from the filing date that U.S. business will have a longer patent term and would
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The increase in additional term protection is thus not linked to Congress'
intellectual property power. In other words, it is not "to promote the
progress of useful arts," but rather to harmonize the term with other WTO
f
countries. 252
The fear is that once we create this gap between the
Constitution and the patent laws, there will be no sensible, definable

stopping point.

2. Copyright Term Extension - A Return to the Concept of Guaranteed
Income?
Lest one think this fear is unfounded, the copyright term provides a
meaningful comparison, as both the copyright and patent laws derive from
the same Intellectual Property Clause. The copyright term also was initially
a 14-year term. Since then, it has increased almost exponentially. It has
gone from 14 years to 42 years (1831), to 56 years (1909), to life-plus-50
years (1976) to the current life-plus-70 years under the Copyright Term
Extension Act (1998). Sonny Bono, after whom the latest copyright
extension act is named, desired life in perpetuity, but this would have been
unconstitutional, as a perpetual copyright would violate the Constitution's
"limited times" prescription. His widow and congressional successor
253
proclaimed Congress should consider a term of "forever less one day.,
What should be noted with respect to the copyright term increases is that
the primary rationale for those increases was almost entirely for the benefit
of the author. The extensions were to assure authors a fair economic return.
In particular, copyright owners argued that because of the substantial
increased life expectancy and the growth in communication media that
substantially lengthened the commercial life of great works, they were no
longer being adequately compensated. 4 The other rationale for increased
prevent submarine patents); see also 140 Cong. Rec. S15077 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1994)
(statement of Sen. Brown) (stating that the GATT amendment will reduce patent term in the
biotechnology industry). Congress compared the effect of the term change on U.S. industry
with respect to foreign industry. See 140 Cong. Rec. S1524 (daily ed. Jan 25, 1994)
(statement of Sen. DeConcini) (stating that the GATT amendment will allow U.S. industries
to compete with their foreign competitors as a result of the longer patent protection).
However, Congress did not adequately weigh the benefits of changing the patent term
against the costs to the public, the heart of the quid pro quo of patent protection. See
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).
252 Under the "necessary and proper" clause, Congress can pass legislation to fulfill treaty
obligations. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). This does not resolve the
possible conflict between the term change and the Intellectual Property Clause mandate.
253 Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution: A
HistoricalPerspective,49 J.COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 19 (2001).
254 The reasons offered for increased protection include: (1) the 56-year term under the
1909 Act was not long enough to assure an author and his dependents a fair economic return,
given the substantial increase in life expectancy; (2) the growth in communication media
substantially lengthened the commercial life of a great many works, particularly serious
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terms was international: to harmonize the term with WTO countries.2 55
Opponents of the CTEA argued that the term extension would not
benefit the public. If it were applied prospectively it would provide very
little, if any, incentives to produce copyrighted work, and if applied
retroactively, it would provide no incentive whatsoever.
The Supreme
Court nonetheless was able to find a public purpose in the Act, even
intimating that harmonization could further that interest.
This issue was squarely before the Court in Eldred,257 where the
majority held that increased copyright protection did indeed promote
progress. The Eldred majority identified a number of factors supporting its
holding. Specifically, the Court found that Congress passed the CTEA to
be consistent with a European Directive establishing a similar term. 258 This,
according to the majority, "sought to ensure that American authors would
receive the same copyright protection in Europe as their European
counterparts." The Court found that this would provide incentives for
American authors to create and disseminate their work in the United
States. 259 In adiint
addition to the "international concerns," the Court relied on
projections that longer terms would encourage copyright holders to invest
in restoration and public distribution of their works.2 6 0 The majority held
that these considerations promoted the progress of science and
demonstrated that Congress acted rationally in enacting the CTEA.

works which may not initially be recognized by the public; (3) the public does not benefit
from a shorter term, but rather the user groups derive a windfall, as the prices the public pays
for a work often remain the same after the work enters the public domain; (4) a system based
upon the life of the author avoids confusion and uncertainty, because the date of death is
clearer and more definite than the date of publication, and it means that all of a given
author's works will enter the public domain at the same time instead of seriatim as under a
term based on publication; (5) the renewal system is avoided with its highly technical
requirements which often cause inadvertent loss of copyright; (6) a statutory term of lifeplus-fifty years is no more than a fair recompense for those who under the 1909 Act owned
common law copyrights which continued in perpetuity as long as a work remained
unpublished; (7) a majority of the world's countries have a term of life plus fifty; and (8) to
adopt the same term expedites international commerce in literary properties, and opens the
way for membership in the Berne Convention. Walterscheid, Defining the Patent Term,
supra note 104, at 386 (quoting MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAViD NIMMER, 8 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 9.01[A][2] (1999)).
255 Eldred,537 U.S. at 196.
256 Ochoa, supra note 256.
257 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 196.
258 Justice Breyer notes that the statute does not in fact produce uniformity with respect to
the "lion's share" of the copyrighted works-all those works made for hire and all existing
works created before 1978. Id. at 257 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
259 To this, Justice Breyer retorts that "few, if any, potential authors would turn a 'where
to publish' decision upon this particular difference in length of the copyright term." Id. at
259 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
26 Id. at 207.
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Eldred is at once both a good opinion and a bad opinion. It is first
worth noting that the Eldred case was concerned solely with the increased
copyright term.
It did not involve increased patent subject matter
protection, reduced exceptions to intellectual property protection (e.g.,
compulsory licensing), or possible future term extensions (as sought in
TRIPS and TRIPS-plus). Eldred is a good opinion because it makes clear
that even in the context of fulfilling international obligations, Congress
cannot abdicate its responsibility and must ensure that intellectual property
laws promote the public interest.
Eldred is a bad opinion because the Supreme Court abdicated its
responsibility to critically assess whether Congress' action was
constitutional. Instead, the Court noted the deference it must give to
Congress in this area and took Congress' purported public benefits without
testing them. As it now stands, increases in terms may now be predicated
on an inventor receiving "a fair economic return., 26' The patent term may
be heading in the same direction.262
261 Post TRIPS, patent owners secured additional legislation providing for further
extensions, this time based on PTO delays. This was not required by TRIPS and was
ostensibly designed to both encourage prompt responses by the PTO and compensate owners
for lost time due to PTO delays. The new legislation-the Patent Term Guarantee Actensured that the PTO would issue patents within three years, otherwise, owners were granted
extensions for the entire period after three years. The Act also removed the 5-year cap
previously established. Pub. L No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-557-560 (codified as amend, in
scattered sections of35 U.S.C.) (1999).
262 1832 marked a significant shift in Congress' perception of the patent laws' underlying
purpose. In that year, Congress revised the patent laws and as part of that revision responded
to the patentees' persistent lobbying efforts by setting forth conditions for term extensions.
Because the Supreme Court interpreted the Intellectual Property Clause as giving Congress
the discretion to say "when and for what length of time and under what circumstances the
patent for an invention shall be granted," there was little question but that Congress could
provide for term extensions. Blanchardv. Sprague, 3 F.Cas. 648, 650 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839).
However, extending patent protection does nothing to promote new creativity while
subverting the concept of "limited times." Id. Rather than being tied to the purpose of the
Intellectual Property Clause, i.e., to promote the useful arts, these conditions focused
exclusively on whether the patentee received adequate remuneration during the original
patent term. Specifically, the statute required that a petition for extension include "a
statement of the ascertained value of the discovery, invention, or improvement, and of the
receipts and expenditures of the patentee, so as to exhibit the profit or loss arising
therefrom." Walterscheid, Defining the Patent Term, supra note 104, at 374 (quoting Act of
July 3, 1832, § 2, 4 Stat. 559). What makes this provision extraordinary is that there was no
support for it anywhere in the constitutional clause granting Congress the power to grant
patents. In other words, the Constitution provided for patents to promote progress, not to
make sure patentees received what they considered adequate remuneration. Moreover, the
provision elevated the private rights of patentees over that of the public. Unfortunately for
the public, this sentiment and new perception would continue with the next patent law
revision.
In 1836, Congress again provided for term extensions, and once again based these term
extensions on the patentee's private interests. The 1836 Act provided for possible seven-year
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VI. CONCLUSION
The arguments in support of increased protection are premised on one
belief: increasing protection increases the incentives for inventors and
investors. The argument is straightforward. Increased protection reduces
piracy and encourages more inventive activity and more innovation. This
was the driving force behind TRIPS and the resulting increased
international patent protection required of WTO members. However, the
myopic view of increasing protection internationally so as to benefit the
public at home is not only inaccurate but shortsighted. While TRIPS
benefits some economic interests at home, these narrow economic interests
are not the public interests we are concerned with. In fact, the public is
harmed because of TRIPS' constraining nature and its effect of shrinking
the public domain.
Moreover, this increased protection is at odds with traditional U.S.
patent law. Traditional U.S. patent law has always been understood as
promoting public interests through incentives to private parties. The United
States' intellectual property system is not, nor has it ever been, simply for
the benefit of private interests. Accordingly, throughout the history of the
United States increased intellectual property protection has been not simply
for the sake of increasing protection but to continue to promote the progress
and benefit the public.
TRIPS corrupts this balance because it does not allow for the
dissemination of knowledge or provide information in the ways that U.S.
framers envisioned, but rather simply encourages objectionable monopolies,
which the framers feared. By developing intellectual property rights
through bartering between a trade regime and an intellectual property
regime, in an effort to protect private intellectual property rights, TRIPS
extensions when a Patent Board determined that the patentee "failed to obtain, from the use
and sale of his invention, a reasonable remuneration for their time, ingenuity, and expense
bestowed upon the same, and the introduction thereof into use .... " Id. (quoting Act of July
4, 1836 § 18, 5 Stat. 117). "The statute is.. founded upon the idea... of rewarding to [the
individual] an enlarged interest and right of property in the invention itself, with a view to
secure to him, with greater certainty, a fair and reasonable remuneration." Wilson v.
Rousseau, 45 U.S. 646, 675 (1846). The Board was also to give "due regard to the public
interest." However, as Walterscheid notes, this was mere lip service. Walterscheid,
Defining the Patent Term, supra note 104, at 375 (quoting Act of July 4, 1836 § 18, 5 Stat.
117). Because both the 1832 and 1836 provisions were predicated on the patentee receiving
adequate remuneration, each patentee could, theoretically, extend the patent term indefinitely
depending upon what Congress deemed adequate or reasonable. In effect, patentees were
assured guaranteed income by continually seeking renewals until they were fully
compensated for their time and effort. The House Committee on Patents feared just this. Id.
(citing Christine P. Benagh, The History of Private Patent Legislation, SUBCOMM. ON
COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE

ON THE JUDICIARY, 96TH CONG., THE HISTORY OF PRIVATE PATENT LEGISLATION IN THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 9 (Comm. Print 1979)).
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fails to adequately take into account the public interest, and may actually
harm the United States and retard innovation. While the harm may have
been unintended, a shift in emphasis which favors one interest (private) will
probably be achieved only at the expense of the other interest (public).
In light of the harms caused in the U.S. and abroad, TRIPS must be
reevaluated and reinterpreted.
The United States must pursue an
interpretation that will reduce inconsistencies between TRIPS and enacting
legislation that will promote progress and benefit the public. Articulating'a
commitment to the public interest in the Constitution is one thing;
practicing it is another.

